by Kori Schake
What are the dangers for the U.S. and the international community in intervening in Libya?
High Risks for Acting Now
Secretary Clinton is right to emphasize that military options are under consideration for limiting Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi's ability to continue terrorizing Libyans, and our military can be helpful in visibly moving strike assets into range to ensure that President Obama has a wide range of choices. Colonel Qaddafi's erratic behavior strongly argues for keeping our options open.
Four reasons to exercise caution toward Libya.
We absolutely should try to convince the Libyan leader to stop fighting, that the consequences of continuing on his current course will be more detrimental than fleeing the country. And we should encourage his supporters to abandon him. Although other forms of pressure -- even the draconian U.N. Security Council sanctions spearheaded by Britain and France and the Treasury Department freezing $30 billion in Libyan assets -- have not resonated with Colonel Qaddafi, given the Reagan administration's attacks on Tripoli in 1986, the threat of American military power should carry some weight.
That said, we ought to be very cautious about actually using American military force to affect the rebellion in Libya, for four reasons.
First, it is difficult to see what practical measures, short of removing Colonel Gaddafi ourselves or sending military teams into Libya to assist rebel forces, would affect the fight. Defection of military units and tribes seems to have given rebels the necessary weapons; most of the fighting is urban operations not much involving air power.
Second, we have not had an ambassador in Libya for months, and we have evacuated our diplomats; we ought not overestimate how much we understand what is occurring in the country or the shape Libya's rebellion will take. Arming rebels or undertaking military operations on their behalf makes us parties to the conflict, the inchoate nature of Libya's rebels argues for caution.
Third, debate over the Security Council resolution suggests it is unlikely the Chinese and Russians would authorize the use of force (they had to be assured the resolution that passed would not), and NATO would not be an alternative without a U.N. mandate. Countries in the region are not likely to be supportive. While international pressure seems to be having little effect on Colonel Qaddafi, international institutions and support are central to the Obama administration's approach. Military force would have to be a unilateral or by coalition of the willing, which is at odds with the White House's political strategy.
Fourth, military force is sticky -- once the president commits American military forces to involvement, even tangentially, he commits the nation. It is difficult to disengage if the limited force committed doesn't achieve the president's objectives, as President Bill Clinton learned in both Somalia and Kosovo, and President George W. Bush realized, leading him to authorize a surge of forces in Iraq in 2006. While symbolic strikes on Colonel Qaddafi's palaces or no-flight zones would be a show of force, they raise the question of how far we are willing to go to achieve our objectives.
The administration has given no indication of serious commitment. Colonel Qaddafi is likely to bet rightly on the limits of President Obama's willingness to force him from power, which could lead to several bad outcomes for us: ineffectual shows of force, the president pulled in further than our interests dictate, or alienation of countries whose support we need to manage other important national security problems.
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