Showing posts with label Economy article. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Economy article. Show all posts

Saturday, February 11, 2012

Ten Minutes With Italy's Mario Monti


Submitted by CrownThomas on 02/10/2012 22:43 -0500
Italy's Prime Minister (and self appointed economy minister) shot over to CNBC after his meeting with President Obama this afternoon to discuss how well everything looks for Italy since he was elected took over.
Notable Comments:
  • Italian banks are "vulnerable" but have recapitalized themselves (rather, the ECB has given them money )
  • He had a good meeting with Obama, and Obama is supportive (he's careful to mention not financially supportive - perhaps forgetting how much theFederal Reserve bails out Euro banks )
  • A plan has been in place since January 1st to balance the budget by 2013 (Obama apparently didn't pay attention to this little tidbit )
  • Political cost is not a relevant matter... for the unelected government - the people will be happy to know it doesn't matter one bit what they want, the former Goldman Advisor knows what's best for them
  • He plans to transfer tax burdens to indvidual property owners and not burden corporations (should help the middle class)
  • S&P decision to downgrade Italian banks was due to previous leadership's decisions (he learned a little from President Obama)
  • ?
FTW: "If somebody considers investing in Italy now, thy should not be too worried about what comes next"
A few visuals on why nobody should worry:
  



Sunday, September 25, 2011

CDS Implied Probability of Default – Be Careful

by Peter Tchir

Unless something changes in the next 24 hours, I expect we will hear more and more talk about default, not only of Greece but of other countries and of banks. Just in case that happens, here is some information that may help you make good decisions. There will be lots of chatter about the “likelihood of default” the CDS market is implying, but although it can be a useful statistic, it can also be very misleading. Before jumping into trades based on erroneous assumptions, it is worth spending a few minutes reading this. If all it does is confuse you, maybe that is a good thing in itself, because you won’t take a headline about default probability as fact.

Recovery is Key and is often assumed away making default probability calculations less useful
Let’s start with a simple example. You have bonds of 2 different companies, each maturing in the near term, both trading at 70. What is the probability of default of each of these companies? You don’t know because that isn’t enough information. You know the bonds are trading at 70, and without a default they would pay par, providing a 30 point return. What you need to know to figure out the probability of default, is what the recovery value will be. Let’s assume that the recovery value for one company is going to be 60 and for the other will be 10. Then in the first case, the default probability is 75%. There is a 75% chance an investor would lose 10 points, and a 25% chance that they would lose 30 points, giving an “expected” value of 0 (today’s risk free rate). In the second case the default probability is only 33% (66% chance of 30 point gain plus a 33% chance of a 60 point loss).

So recovery is a key element of determining what default probability the market is pricing in. Yet, although it is key, it is often assumed to be 40% or some other number based on historical averages. That is a reason to be very concerned when you see a default probability mentioned. It is useless without looking at the recovery value, and recovery value isn’t easy to figure out. Recovery value is figuring out the enterprise value of a company after it has defaulted. It is not any easier than figuring out enterprise value of a company that is not in default, so treat estimated recovery values with the respect they deserve.

In the CDS pricing model, there are 3 key variables: the spread, the recovery value, and the up-front premium. If you know any 2 of those 3, then you can solve for the other. The market trades with the assumption of 40% recovery. That let’s traders quote a spread, and then the up-front premium is just a calculation. This is done more out of convenience than anything else. Agreeing to a recovery rate on each trade would be time consuming, and 40% seems reasonable enough for the purposes of calculating the up-front.

For high quality (tight spread names) the up-front premium is not very sensitive to recovery.
For names that trade at 400 over (BAC for example), the probability to default over 5 years is 21% with a 10% recovery, and 51% with a 70% recovery. So you need to take any probability of default derived from CDS prices with a grain of salt. Without a rational assumption for recovery, the probability of default is somewhat meaningless. Since changing recovery would change the “up front” premium, you could try and argue that the recovery must be valid. I would argue that the smartest credit investors figure out what premium they need to earn to take the risk, based on their assumptions, and then figure out what spread in a 40% recovery model world gives that up-front premium.

At the other extreme, names will eventually trade in “points”. With a 40% recovery in the model, there is no spread that can give an up-front premium of more than 60. If a dealer was willing to buy protection and pay 55 points up front, or sell that protection at 57 points up front, most investors wouldn’t complain about the liquidity. It would be as good as in the bond market. On the other hand, if the same dealer quoted that market as 3470/4430 some client might argue that 1000 bps seems egregious. Also, if a company has a bond trading at 35, dealers will not want to floor recovery at 40 since a bond trading at 35 shouldn’t exist if recovery is 40. So as default becomes more likely, the model becomes less useful.
The Curve is also important

For simplicity and market convention, the 5 year cumulative default probability is based on a flat curve. As a situation deteriorates it becomes more important to look at each point on the curve. Two names trading at 1000 in 5 year CDS would have the same implied probability of default from the standard model. But if one is trading “inverted” at the short end, and the other is steep, then at the very least the timing of default that is being priced is very different. An inverted curve means the risk of default in the near term is much higher. If you, as an investor are going to make decisions based on default probability headlines, you need to look at the curve. The 5 year default probability is a nice headline, but the devil is in the details.
Sovereigns are even more problematic when divining default probabilities

Sovereign CDS for Eurozone countries trades in USD. CDS on US government debt trades in Euros. This helps explain why CDS trades so wide for many sovereign names. If you bought €10 million of a European sovereign at par, and it defaulted, recovering 40%, you would have lost €6 million. If you had bought CDS in Euro that trade would basically offset it. If you bought protection in $’s and the exchange rate was unchanged, you would break even on the trade. But many investors believe that a default of a European sovereign would cause the Euro to get a lot weaker. So let’s say at the time of the trade the FX rate was 1.40. You would need to purchase $14 million of CDS to cover the €10 million bond position. If the default occurs and the FX rate went to 1.20, then you would have made $8.4 million on the CDS trade, which when converted back to Euros at 1.2 is now €7 million.

If investors believe an FX move is highly correlated with default, they will pay more for CDS. They make more on their negative view than they would if the FX trade wasn’t embedded. Similarly they lose less if the market rebounds. Their position in the bonds will go up, while their losing position in CDS gets converted back into more expensive Euros, thus mitigating their losses.

So on sovereign CDS, particularly at times of stress where the market clearly believes that a default is bad for the currency, the CDS spread is not just pricing in default, it is pricing in default with a currency move, making implied default probability less useful.

On top of that, recovery for sovereigns is purely guesswork. Creditors have NO rights. There is nothing they can do to try and collect on their bad debts. It is purely a negotiation. That is why the distressed investors don’t do much in sovereigns, because they are used to playing by rules, and in a sovereign default there are no rules. In some sovereign defaults, shorter dated bonds have received better treatment than longer dated bonds. That is uncommon in corporate defaults, but not uncommon in sovereign defaults, making picking a recovery value even more difficult.
Cheapest to Deliver Bonds

For banks, financials, and sovereigns the cheapest to deliver option embedded in CDS has less impact on daily CDS prices because they are such frequent issuers. For companies with fewer bonds, the cheapest to deliver option can impact CDS prices, without really impacting probability of default in the real world. If two very similar companies existed, but one had only issued bonds at times of high coupons, and the other had issued when rates were very low, the CDS on the low coupon bond company should trade a bit wider. Investors who like the “basis package” where they buy bonds and buy CDS generally prefer to buy lower priced bonds because they can benefit from a “jump to default” and lock in their basis trade profits sooner than later.

The 3 Most Vulnerable Sectors


These major market sectors are still looking very vulnerable and are likely to continue to underperform the S&P in the months ahead. Use careful risk controls to avoid big losing positions.

The late-in-session drop in the stock market after the Fed announcement was consistent with the deterioration in the technical outlook discussed yesterday. The McClellan Oscillator has broken below support, which makes a further drop very likely.

Three of the major sectors look most vulnerable to further selling and they are likely to underperform the S&P 500. Even though technology was also lower, it continues to show better relative performance, or RS analysis, which suggests the tech sector will hold above the August lows.

For the Select Sector SPDR – Energy (XLE), it is important to keep an eye on crude oil prices. As I have frequently pointed out, crude oil often leads the stock market on both the up and down side. November crude oil was down over $2 yesterday, and a break of key support would be a negative for the energy sector and stocks in general.

Chart Analysis: November crude oil completed its flag formation, lines a and b, on Monday, but so far, the short-term lows in the $84.65-$84.90 area are holding. The key chart support is now at $83.47.
  • There is further support at $79.76 and then at $76.61. The 127.2% Fibonacci retracement target is at $72.53
  • The on-balance volume (OBV) broke its uptrend, line c, on September 9 before rebounding sharply
  • Volume has been heavy over the past three days and the OBV now shows a pattern of lower highs and lower lows
  • Crude oil has resistance at $88 with stronger resistance in the $89-$90.63 area
The weekly chart of the Select Sector SPDR – Energy (XLE) shows that it is not far above the weekly uptrend (line d) and the 50% retracement support in the $59-$59.40 area. XLE completed a daily head-and-shoulders top formation in May.
  • The major 61.8% Fibonacci support stands at $54.50
  • The relative performance, or RS analysis, turned positive in October 2010, signaling that XLE was going to be stronger than the S&P 500. The RS analysis topped in May and is negative, as it is still below its declining weighted moving average (WMA)
  • The weekly OBV formed a negative divergence, line f, at the late-April highs. The OBV needs to break this downtrend to turn positive. The OBV is below its weighted moving average
  • There is initial resistance for XLE at $67.76-$69.90

The Select Sector SPDR – Industrial (XLI) has been one of the weakest sector ETFs, down 24.6% from the April high at $38.98. The daily chart shows a completed head-and-shoulders top formation, as the neckline (line a) was broken in July.
  • The daily chart shows next support at the uptrend (line b) in the $29.50 area
  • Major 50% retracement support stands at $27.40 with the downside target from the daily chart formation at $26.40
  • The daily uptrend in the RS (line c) was broken in May and still looks negative
  • Daily OBV confirmed the completion of the top formation when it dropped through long-term support at line d
  • Weekly OBV formed a negative divergence at the May highs and is still negative
  • There is initial resistance for XLE at $32.20 and then at $32.89
The Select Sector SPDR – Materials (XLB) closed below short-term support, line g, on Wednesday. This suggests it will continue to lead the market lower. The daily chart shows a completed top formation, lines e and f.
  • Major 50% retracement support is at $29.70
  • The daily chart formation has downside targets in the $28.50 area
  • The daily uptrend in the RS, line h, that goes back to the 2010 lows, was broken in early May. The RS is now dropping very sharply and XLB is acting weaker than the S&P 500
  • The OBV is in a solid downtrend, line i, though we may have seen a selling climax in early August
What It Means: These three key sectors have been the weakest over the past four months. The weakness in crude oil suggests it is ready for one more decline, but the longer-term technical analysis for crude oil suggests that this could complete a bottom formation. Therefore, the energy sector may bottom out first.

The industrials and materials sectors gave weekly sell signals in May (see “2 Key Sectors Top Out”). Both now look ready to lead the markets lower, and a resurgence of growth in the emerging markets is likely necessary before these sectors turn around.

How to Profit: I see no real profit opportunities at this time, but those holding stocks in these sectors should be sure to use stops on all positions to limit the risk. It is tough to come back from a 30%-40% hit in one position.

When Stocks Yielding More Than Treasuries


On Wed. Sept. 21, the divided Federal Reserve voted to revive a half-century-old procedure to push down long-term interest rates and make it cheaper for businesses, municipalities and consumers to borrow funds. The Fed announced it would direct $400 billion from the sale of short-term Treasuries to investment in those with maturities of six to 30 years.

The decision came at a time when the yield for the S&P 500 exceeds that of 10-year Treasury bonds. As of Monday morning, the S&P 500 had an indicated dividend yield of 2.13%; 10-year Treasury bond yields were below 2%. (An indicated yield is the sum of expected dividends for the next 12 months divided by the stock’s current price.)


Sam Stovall of Standard & Poor’s pointed out the occurrence, observing, “On a quarter-end basis, this has happened only 20 times since 1953. The good news is that in the following 12 months, the S&P 500 rose by an average 20%. The bad news is that past performance is no guarantee of future results.”

Prior to 1953, the yield situation was reversed. Stocks had higher yields than long-term Treasuries. The chart below, and the yields behind it, can be found on the Historical Market Data spreadsheet in the AAII.com Download Library. (This is the same spreadsheet I mentioned two weeks ago.)


There are a few ways you can look at this data. The first is that long-term Treasuries are not a great value right now. The second is that it makes sense to diversify your bond holdings. Corporate, municipal and foreign bonds can all help you get higher yields without much additional credit risk if you choose wisely. The third is that on a yield basis, large-cap stocks appear to be cheap.


I should point out a few caveats. First, a stock can stay cheap (or expensive) far longer than anyone expects. Second, if the U.S. economy remains in a slow growth mode for an extended period of time, interest rates could stay low. Third, bonds provide return of capital, something that stocks do not. Fourth, stocks offer more potential price return than bonds, so total return should always be considered when looking at stocks. Finally, stock and bond returns have been historically uncorrelated, meaning that diversification benefits can be realized when the two are held in a portfolio.

Thus, there is rationale for owning stocks and owning bonds, even in the current uncertain environment. If you are concerned about the economy, consider a mixture of fewer economically sensitive stocks (consumer staples, utilities, health care, etc.) and more growth-oriented companies (technology, energy, etc.). The idea is that you will lower your risk, but you still have the opportunity to profit should the economy turn out to perform better than you anticipate. On the bond side, you can offset interest rate risk by buying bonds with different maturities and reinvesting the proceeds as each bond matures—a strategy referred as bond laddering. Alternatively, you can buy a diversified bond fund with an intermediate duration (a measure of interest rate sensitivity), such as five years.


The Week Ahead

Just three S&P 500 member companies are scheduled to report earnings, all on Tuesday. They are Accenture (ACN), Jabil Circuit (JBL) and Walgreen (WAG).

August new home sales data will be published on Monday, starting off the week’s economic calendar. Tuesday will feature the September Conference Board’s consumer confidence survey and the July S&P Case-Shiller home price index. August durable goods orders will be published on Wednesday. Thursday will feature August pending home sales and the final revision to second-quarter GDP. August personal income and spending, the final September University of Michigan consumer sentiment survey and the September Chicago PMI will be published on Friday.

Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank President Narayana Kocherlakota will speak publicly on Monday. St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank President James Bullard will speak on Monday and Friday. Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank President Dennis Lockhart will speak on Tuesday. Boston Federal Reserve Bank President Eric Rosengren will speak on Wednesday and Thursday. Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank President Charles Plosser will speak on Thursday.

The Treasury Department will auction $35 billion of two-year notes on Tuesday, $35 billion of five-year notes on Wednesday and $29 billion of seven-year notes on Thursday.

Multi-Trillion Euro Bailout Plan Allegedly in the Works; Plan Has Failed Already

by Mike Shedlock

The rumor mills are flying this Saturday regarding a Multi-trillion plan to save the eurozone.

Telegraph: European officials are working on a grand plan to restore confidence in the single currency area that would involve a massive bank recapitalisation, giving the bail-out fund several trillion euros of firepower, and a possible Greek default.

German and French authorities have begun work on a three-pronged strategy behind the scenes amid escalating fears that the eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis is spiralling out of control.

Their aim is to build a “firebreak” around Greece, Portugal and Ireland to prevent the crisis spreading to Italy and Spain, countries considered “too big to bail”.

Mish: If that's the plan it, it has failed already. The crisis has already spread to Spain and Italy. In fact, one look at European bank stocks says it has spread to France and Germany as well.

Telegraph: Sources said the plan would have to be released as a whole, as the elements would not work in isolation.

Mish: Lovely. In a typical bicycle wheel if one spoke gets broken the wheel still works fine. In the proposed wheel, if a spoke breaks, the bicycle crashes.

Telegraph: First, Europe’s banks would have to be recapitalised with many tens of billions of euros to reassure markets that a Greek or Portuguese default would not precipitate a systemic financial crisis. The recapitalisation plan would go much further than the €2.5bn (£2.2bn) required by regulators following the European bank stress tests in July and crucially would include the under-pressure French lenders.

Mish: Will French leaders and French banks go along? Just last week they were insistent that French banks were well capitalized.

Telegraph: Officials are confident that some banks could raise the funds privately, but if they are unable they would either be recapitalised by the state or by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) – the eurozone’s €440bn bail-out scheme.

Mish: Recapitalized "by the state" means taxpayers. Will Germany, Finland, Austria, and the Netherlands go along?

Telegraph:The second leg of the plan is to bolster the EFSF. Economists have estimated it would need about Eu2 trillion of firepower to meet Italy and Spain’s financing needs in the event that the two countries were shut out of the markets. Officials are working on a way to leverage the EFSF through the European Central Bank to reach the target.
The complex deal would see the EFSF provide a loss-bearing “equity” tranche of any bail-out fund and the ECB the rest in protected “debt”. If the EFSF bore the first 20pc of any loss, the fund’s warchest would effectively be bolstered to Eu 2 trillion. If the EFSF bore the first 40pc of any loss, the fund would be able to deploy Eu1 trillion.
Using leverage in this way would allow governments substantially to increase the resources available to the EFSF without having to go back to national parliaments for approval, which in a number of eurozone countries would prove highly problematic.

Mish: This leveraged proposal with the ECB backing it up has already been rejected by the ECB. Moreover, such a proposal with the ECB taking leveraged risk would be in violation of the Maastricht Treaty.

Telegraph: Gathering turmoil in financial markets has convinced Germany to begin work of some kind of variant of the US plan, despite having initially rejected the notion as unworkable as threatening to compromise ECB independence.
The proposal would be hugely sensitive in Germany as its parliament has yet to ratify the July 21 agreement to allow the EFSF to inject capital into banks and buy the sovereign debt of countries not under a European Union and International Monetary Fund restructuring programme. The vote is due on September 29.

Mish: The current EFSF proposal is sketchy enough already. It will likely pass. However, Merkel may go down in flames because of it. The Guardian notes "Merkel looks sure to win the Sept. 29 vote on the European Financial Stability Facility because opposition parties support the bill, designed to give the EFSF more powers after an agreement by EU leaders in July. However, her job could be on the line if she has to rely on the opposition and fails to persuade rebels from her conservative camp and the Free Democrats (FDP), her junior coalition partners. Opposition parties have said Merkel would be finished politically if that were the case and have threatened to call for fresh elections. If that happened, the ensuing uncertainty would send shockwaves through the euro zone as it tries to tackle its debt crisis."

Bear in mind the above mess pertains to the existing proposal for 440 billion Euros. What would the vote be for a €2.5 billion proposal?

Telegraph: As quid pro quo for an enhanced bail-out, the Germans are understood to be demanding a managed default by Greece but for the country to remain within the eurozone. Under the plan, private sector creditors would bear a loss of as much as 50pc – more than double the 21pc proposal currently on the table. A new bail-out programme would then be devised for Greece.

Mish: Will the ECB, IMF, and France go along with that? What about the German parliament?

Telegraph: Officials would hope the plan would stem the panic in the markets and stop bond vigilantes targeting Italy and Spain, which European and IMF figures believe should not be in any immediate distress but are in need of longer-term structural reform.

Mish: So here we are, with a half-baked 2+ trillion Euro proposal, highly likely in violation of the Maastricht Treaty, that all 17 nations in the Eurozone would have to approve. Finland, Austria, the Netherlands, and Germany are already balking over various proposals and Finland in particular wants collateral.
This multi-trillion idea is "in hope the plan would stem the panic in the markets and stop bond vigilantes targeting Italy and Spain".

The plan is supposed to pass by November? Really? And the aim is to spend 2 trillion to stop something from happening that has already happened.

“Why I’m An Austrian In Economics”

By Thomas Mayer

This article is by Dr. Thomas Mayer, Chief Economist for Deutsche Bank Group and Head of Deutsche Bank Research. Before Dr. Mayer joined Deutsche Bank in 2002, he worked for Goldman Sachs in Frankfurt and London (1991-2002), and for Salomon Brothers in London (1990-91). Before moving to the private sector, he held positions at the International Monetary Fund in Washington D.C. (1983-1990) and at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (1978-82).
We welcome Dr. Mayer to the Daily Capitalist.

Introduction

The financial crisis has led many people to doubt the merits of free markets and a liberal economic regime. They blame markets for the financial and economic crisis and demand tighter regulation and, in effect, more central planning by governments as a remedy. We shall argue that both the analysis on which this view is based and the policy recommendations are flawed. This crisis has been caused by too much reliance on the effectiveness of economic and financial planning. Failure of the “liquidationists” to overcome the Great Depression of the early 1930s prepared the ground for an era of interventionist economic policies. Modern macroeconomics and finance nourished the belief that we can successfully plan for the future. But the present crisis teaches us that we live in a world of Knightian uncertainty, where the “unknown unknowns” dominate and our plans for the future are regularly thwarted by unforeseen and unforeseeable events. We have suffered from “control illusion.” We need to recognize the limits of planning for the future and the superiority of a market-liberal economic order, where states, firms and individuals can be held liable for the financial decisions they have taken.

The predecessor of today’s crisis

To develop our point we first take a look at the historical predecessor of today’s financial crisis, the depression of the 1930s. During the 1920s easy monetary conditions and an exaggerated appetite for risk, evidenced by extreme leverage in the popular equity trusts, fuelled the build-up of a stock price bubble. When monetary conditions were tightened eventually, the edifice of leverage came down and the stock market crashed in October 1929.

At the time, the authorities took the crash in their stride. Many policy makers felt that the crash and a possible recession afterwards were needed to eliminate the excesses and imbalances that had built up during the roaring twenties. Andrew Mellon, then US Secretary of the Treasury, brought this view to the point when he said:
“…liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate farmers, liquidate real estate… it will purge the rottenness out of the system. High costs of living and high living will come down. People will work harder, live a more moral life. Values will be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up from less competent people.” (Hoover, Herbert (1952). Memoirs. Hollis and Carter. p. 30). Inspired by Mellon’s attitude, those sharing the idea that a recession was a “cleansing event” were later dubbed “liquidationists.”
The “liquidationists” could claim theoretical support for their view from the Austrian school of economics around Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich von Hayek, which built its view of the business cycle on the work of the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell. Wicksell distinguished between a natural rate of interest, which reflects the return on investment, and a market rate, which reflects the borrowing costs of funds charged by the banks. When the market rate is below the natural rate, companies borrow to invest and the economy expands. In the opposite case, investment is reduced and the economy contracts.

The Austrian school used this idea to develop a theory of the business cycle that puts the credit cycle in the centre (see picture left). Low interest rates stimulate borrowing from the banking system. The expansion of credit induces an expansion of the supply of money through the banking system. This in turn leads to an unsustainable credit-fueled investment boom during which the “artificially stimulated” borrowing seeks out diminishing investment opportunities. The boom results in widespread overinvestment, causing capital resources to be misallocated into areas which would not attract investment if the credit supply remained stable. The expansion turns into bust when credit creation cannot be sustained – perhaps because of an increase in the market rate or a fall in the natural rate – and a “credit crunch” sets in. Money supply suddenly and sharply contracts when markets finally “clear,” causing resources to be reallocated back toward more efficient uses.1


The liquidationist approach to economic policy in the aftermath of the 1929 stock market crash – for which Mellon became the symbol – accepted the downturn in the early 1930s as inevitable. What they missed was that extreme risk aversion can keep the market rate above the natural rate even after ?the rottenness? has been “purged out of the system.” Franklin D. Roosevelt, who beat Hoover in the 1932 presidential elections, seems to have intuitively understood this problem. Perhaps the most important action Roosevelt took shortly after his inauguration in early 1933 was to guarantee bank deposits. As a result, cash that people had hoarded under their mattresses came back to the banks and improved their liquidity situation. When the Roosevelt administration later in the year recapitalized banks, credit extension picked up again and the economy recovered. It is interesting that there was no big fiscal policy stimulus in 1933 – the famous New Deal was felt only later. Hence, contrary to conventional wisdom, the spark that ignited the recovery of 1934 was the turn in the credit cycle (see chart).

The experience of the depression and the Roosevelt recovery induced John Maynard Keynes to launch a heavy attack on the Austrian school. In his General Theory, written in 1935, he made a strong case for government intervention. Fiscal policy should come to the rescue when the public feared deflation and hoarded money. Many students of economics today believe that it was the application of Keynes’ theory that ended the downturn of 1930-33. We do not agree. In our reading of events it was the policy-induced turn of the credit cycle that did the trick. Hence, the recovery of 1934 was more “Austrian” than “Keynesian”. Let us be clear: The liquidationists were wrong to allow the depression to happen as they failed to recognize that fear can beget fear. Roosevelt recognized this when in his inaugural speech he said “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself,” and he was right to intervene and stabilize the banks. But what he did – opening the credit markets – is what follows from an Austrian reading of the business cycle.


The Austrians have warned that a policy-induced extension of the credit cycle before all excesses have been eliminated in the economy will only delay the day of reckoning. But also they would have had to conclude that after the depression of 1930-33 one could hardly still see “excesses” in the economies of the western world. Nevertheless, the economy tanked again in 1937 when the monetary and later fiscal policy support was withdrawn. Most economic historians argue that the period of economic instability in the US only ended towards the end of the 1930s when the country prepared for war. The British historian Niall Ferguson has even argued, that Germany got out of the depression ahead of the US because of its earlier and more aggressive preparations for war. It seems that only in the anticipation of war the “fear of fear itself” ceased to be a de-stabilising factor in economic developments.

The historical review of the Great Depression leaves us with a disturbing conclusion: The Austrian credit cycle theory seems to have a better fit to events than Keynes’ theory of the liquidity trap and power of fiscal policy (see chart). What the Austrians seem to have missed is that an economy paralyzed by extreme risk aversion may need a jolt by confidence-building economic policy measures. But this was not what most economists and policy makers concluded.

Lessons from the Great depression: “Over to governments…”

At the end of WWII a number of western intellectuals and economists flirted with Soviet-style central planning. After all, the Soviet Union had prospered during the 1930s while the capitalist countries had been in crisis. Did this not prove that their economic model was superior?

Having lost the intellectual battle with Keynes and followers in the 1930s, the Austrians made a last stand against central economic planning with Hayek’s powerful book “The Road to Serfdom” published in 1946. They won the war of principles and the western world did not subscribe to Soviet-style central planning, despite the allure this model was exercising on many intellectuals after WWII. Even Keynes sided with the Austrians as far as the high ground was concerned and wrote to Hayek: “In my opinion it is a grand book … Morally and philosophically I find myself in agreement with virtually the whole of it: and not only in agreement with it, but in deeply moved agreement.”

Nevertheless, the Austrians lost the battle over economic policy in the post-WWII western countries. Keynes’ idea of “demand management” through fiscal policy became the mantra there after the war. Somewhat belatedly, in 1971 when he ended the link of the US Dollar to Gold, even Richard Nixon is reported to have said “I’m now a Keynesian in economics.”

From the 1950s to the end of the 1970s western economic policy makers used and abused fiscal policy as an economic management tool. Governments were quite happy to raise borrowing in economic downturns, but generally reluctant to bring it down in upturns. Towards the end of the 1960s, the use and abuse of fiscal policy created strains on government finances that could only be eased by the monetization of government debt. As a consequence, Richard Nixon on August 15, 1971 suspended the link of the USD to gold, and in effect launched the post-WWII system of fiat money.

During the post WWII period of the implicit gold standard under the Bretton-Woods System (where the USD was supposedly as good as gold), there was hardly any room for pro-active monetary policy (which, however, did not prevent the US government to use the money printing press as an auxiliary funding tool). This changed drastically after Nixon’s decision of 1971. The result was a bout of inflation as government debt and deficits were financed in part by the money printing press. As both growth and inflation disappointed, the word ?stagflation? was coined to describe the economic conditions of the 1970s.

… “over to the central banks”

The failure of the young new fiat money regime was that it lacked a monetary anchor. As a result, monetary policy ended up accommodating fiscal policy and wage policy developments. This was eventually recognized by policy makers in the early 1980s. In the seventies, Milton Friedman had proposed limits on the expansion of money supply and laid the ground for the introduction of independent central banks. As Stagflation killed the idea that there was a trade-off between inflation and unemployment, the time of monetarism had arrived. Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker used the monetarist demand to “gain control over the money supply” as a justification to engineer a deep recession that brought inflation down. Hence, the early 1980s were a period of repentance for the sins of Keynesianism committed in the late 1960s and 1970s. With the development of the theory of rational expectations and efficient financial markets, the pendulum seemed to swing back from the constructivism of economic policy before to a more market liberal regime.
But the straitjacket intended by Friedman for monetary policy did not hold long. In the course of the 1980s monetary policy freed itself from the Friedman straitjacket and turned pro-active. The great champion of this approach to monetary policy was Alan Greenspan, who followed Volcker in 1987.

The 1987 stock market crash was the first application of the proactive use of monetary policy. To fend off recession risks, Greenspan cut interest rates. The therapy worked and instead of decelerating the economy accelerated during the late 1980s. The next occasion to apply the Greenspan method came in the wake of the savings-and-loans-crisis at the end of the 1980s, which contributed to the recession of 1990-91. Again, the Greenspan Fed cut interest rates to support the economy and again succeeded in mitigating the downturn. In the following years, the Greenspan method was applied again to fight the Asian emerging market and LTCM crisis of 1998 and again when the dot.com bubble burst in 2000-2002. Until the great financial crisis that began in 2007, it seemed that the Greenspan method, the pro-active use of monetary policy to fine-tune economic developments, had succeeded in abolishing the business cycle as we knew it. Thanks to the art of central bankers, the age of the Great Moderation had arrived.


The great financial crisis that erupted in 2007 uncovered the Great Moderation as a great illusion. Nevertheless, the old reflexes led to the combined deployment of monetary and fiscal policy on a so far unprecedented scale. As the excessive leverage built up in the illusory age of the Great Moderation was unwound, the crisis moved from the US sub-prime mortgage sector to the money markets, the banking sector and more recently to the public sector (see chart). The principle has been to shift the unbearable burden of debt from weaker to stronger shoulders and lower debt service costs through monetary policy induced interest rate cuts. But in this process the previously strong shoulders have also been weakened. Somehow the old tricks seem to have lost their magic, and the crisis triggered by massive de-leveraging appears to be getting out of control.

The theory behind “Greenspanism”

What was the major flaw that led us into this crisis? The belief that even in a world of uncertainty economic and financial outcomes could be planned was in our view a major contributor. The assumptions of rational expectations and efficient financial markets laid the ground for overconfidence in the ability of policy makers, firms and individuals to successfully plan for the future despite the uncertainties surrounding us.

At the macro level, rational expectations and efficient markets theory laid the ground for inflation targeting by major central banks, which replaced the monetary targeting of the early 1980s. The economy was expected to grow in a steady state, if only the central bank ensured stable and low consumer price inflation. The overconfidence in the power of the central bank led Paul Krugman to claim in the late 1990s:
“If you want a simple model for predicting the unemployment rate in the United States over the next few years, here it is: It will be what Greenspan wants it to be, plus or minus a random error reflecting the fact that he is not quite God.”
When individuals had rational expectations and markets were efficient there was no need to worry about asset markets or regulate financial markets. After all, how could central banks or regulators know more than the market when market prices reflected all available information about the future? Anyone questioning the wisdom of the ruling paradigm was regarded as old-fashioned by the academic cardinals of the Church of Anglo-Saxon economics, which has reigned supreme. In retrospect, it seems a bit odd that academics overlooked financial markets’ obsession with central banks and the cult status they awarded central bankers. How could financial market participants hang on the lips of central bankers, when they so efficiently processed all available information in real time? But economists were too enamored with their theories to dwell much on such oddities.

At the micro level, rational expectations and efficient markets theory laid the ground for many highly leveraged financial products and risk management. Financial market participants saw only “known unknowns” that could be quantified with probability theory. In a world of “known unknowns” they felt that there was little need for contingencies for the truly unforeseen, the “unknown unknowns”.2 Hence, it seemed fully appropriate to raise leverage to the extreme. After all, risk managers could calculate continuously and real time the value that could be lost when the unknown happened. The feeling of being in control – of being able to plan ahead with good, if not perfect, foresight – laid the ground for the extremely high leverage that was built into financial products and the balance sheet of financial firms.

After the burst of “control illusion”

The collapse of these theories enforces the radical reduction of leverage. If we cannot anticipate the range of future outcomes with a relatively high degree of certainty, we need more slack and buffers in the system for unforeseen events, and hence cannot afford high degrees of leverage.
The helplessness of the economic profession in the face of the present crisis manifests itself by the recommendations of prominent economists for ever-stronger incentives for a renewed increase of leverage. They advise that fiscal policy turn expansionary again, central bank policy rates be kept at zero for a long time, and central banks purchase financial assets.

At present the central banks fight the reduction in leverage with the issuance of ever more central bank money. As outside money implodes inside money explodes. For now, the aim to reduce leverage depresses asset prices and leads to a flight into money. But the more the central banks succeed to replace the reduction of outside money through de-leveraging by an expansion of inside money, the more likely becomes the monetization of outstanding debt.

The desperate attempt to avoid an economic crisis caused by the necessary de-leveraging could eventually lead to a crisis of the fiat money system itself. On August 15 this year, the fiat money system celebrated its 40th birthday. Since Nixon cut the dollar’s link to gold on August 15, 1971, the dollar has depreciated by 98% against gold (see chart). Depreciation came in two stages: First during the 1970s, when the excess supply of US Dollars created towards the end of the BW-System and at the beginning of the new fiat-money system boosted consumer price inflation, and secondly after the implosion of the credit-driven ?Great Moderation? as of 2007, when bad assets started to move from private sector via public sector to central bank balance sheets.

When fiat money fails it may well be replaced by money backed by real assets that cannot be augmented with the stroke of the pen of central bankers. How could this happen? One possibility – which at present may sound a bit like science fiction – would be for China and other big EM countries to peg the value of their currencies to a basket of commodities. It would then be up to the industrial countries to try to stabilize their currencies against the Yuan, or accept the inflation that goes along with secular depreciation.

To conclude:

Modern macro- and financial economics are based on the belief that economic agents always hold rational expectations and that markets are always efficient, in other words, that the earth is flat. We now find out that this is not true. There are elements of irrationality and inefficiencies in the behavior of people and markets. Therefore we need to dump the flat-earth theories promising that economic and financial outcomes can be planned with a high degree of certainty and need to look at other theories that accept the limits of our knowledge about the future. A revival of Austrian economics could be a good start for such a research programme.

Unfortunately, however, the battle cry of the public and politicians is for more regulation: regulate banks, regulate markets, regulate financial products! But those who push for blanket regulation suffer from the same control-illusion that got us into this crisis. In our view, instead of more regulation we need more intelligent regulation. At the heart of such regulation must stand the simple recognition that we can at best tentatively plan for the future and must feel our way forward in a process of trial and error.

In a world where we need to reckon with “unknown unknowns” – in a world where Knightian uncertainty reigns – financial firms and investors need larger buffers to cope with the unforeseen, i.e. more equity and less leverage. In a world, where markets are not always liquid but can seize up in a collective fit of panic, financial firms and investors also need a greater reserve of liquidity. Regulation can help to achieve both objectives, but it needs to realize its limits. Regulation will create a false sense of security, unless firms and investors have the incentives to follow sound business practices. The best incentive to do so is to make failure possible. Hence, we need effective resolution regimes for financial firms.

In a world where people have imperfect foresight and do not always behave rationally, and markets are not always efficient, we need to accept that economic policy cannot fine-tune the cycle. All that policy can do is to lean against excessive exuberance and depression during the credit cycle and help avoid the excessive swings of risk appetite that we have seen over the last 10 years. It is unhelpful to pro-actively manipulate the market rate to achieve certain economic growth objectives. Instead we should try to create the conditions for a steady development of credit by allowing the market rate to closely follow the natural rate. When accidents happen, we need to prevent that “fear of fear itself” perpetuates economic crises by ensuring that the banking system is capable to satisfy the demand for credit.

Finally, economists should be more humble. For too long we have tried to be like natural scientists. Like they we like to develop our theories with the method of deduction – start from a few axioms and describe the world in mathematical terms from there. This was a little presumptuous, to say the least. We need to realize that we are to a significant extent a social science. Social scientists, like historians, use the method of induction. They observe, and then develop tentative descriptions of the world from these observations. Because we did not pay enough attention to economic history and relied heavily on formal models of the economy we repeated a number of the mistakes that caused the Great Depression.

Catastrophic Success

By John Mauldin

400 Billion Yellow Aspirins
The US Government Is in the “No-Money-Down” Mortgage Business
Crash Alert?
Is Social Security a Ponzi?
Catastrophic Success
Europe, and Breaking the Light-Speed Barrier
>
Breathes there a man with brain so dead
Who never to himself hath said,
“Social Security looks like a Ponzi Scheme?”
- With apologies to Sir Walter Scott
>
Today we look at Social Security. In the US, Texas Governor Perry touched the third rail of Social Security and called it a Ponzi scheme, which of course immediately made him the leading candidate in the “shoot the messenger” category. Behind the rhetoric, we look at some actual numbers. No, not the unfunded liabilities, that’s too easy. Let’s look at what a heartless, uncompassionate man President Roosevelt was when he started Social Security (and that’s what many will call me after reading this!). Behind the tongue in cheek, there are some very real issues that do not get addressed when we talk about Social Security, but that need to be part of the discussion. And of course, we must start off with the results of the FOMC meeting, which has me feeling not at all amused. What are they thinking? Apparently, they are seeing the results from another, alternative universe. There is a lot to cover as I head off to London, where I will finish this letter.

But first a very important announcement. I am very excited to be able to introduce my readers to a new mutual fund offered by my friends Altegris Investments. This fund is a blend of five commodity trading advisors or CTAs. Normally, to access a CTA you be to be an accredited investor, with all the net-worth requirements and limited liquidity. But Altegris has figured out how to wrap a mutual fund around CTAs and create a fund of commodity traders with all the usual aspects of a mutual fund (daily pricing, liquidity, etc.).

I have long been involved in the commodity-trading advisor space (some 20 years) and am a proponent of CTAs as a way to diversify portfolio risk. I have written a detailed report on this fascinating sector in relation to the fund, and it is available for free at http://www.altegrismutualfunds.com/landing/mauldinreports1.aspx, along with more information on the fund (including the offering memorandum and important risk disclosures, which are also included at the end of this letter).

The fund has been very well received since its launch and has grown rapidly to over $1 billion. There has been very active interest in the professional community, as advisors and brokers are looking for simple and realistic ways to diversify their clients’ portfolio risk, as well as a way that is truly noncorrelated to typical stock funds and many other asset classes. Whether you are a professional or individual, you really should take the time to research what I think is a very solid fund. My partners at Altegris have decades of experience in the CTA space, with the largest database of CTAs and long-term relationships with many of the managers (I actually started my investment career in the commodity fund space, so have more than a passing knowledge of the arena). Given the potential for volatility in the global markets, I think it makes sense to have some exposure to funds that can go both long and short (depending on their models). I urge you to read my report.

400 Billion Yellow Aspirins

My mother used to tell me, “John, if you can’t say something nice, then don’t say anything at all.” So let’s see if I can find something to nice to say about the FOMC announcement. How about: “At least they didn’t cause TOO much damage”? As Rich Yamarone tweeted immediately after, they announced they would buy 400 billion white aspirins and sell 400 billion yellow aspirins. This was not something that should have been done, but thankfully they only did some $400 billion and not a few trillion, which could have really screwed (a technical economics term) things up.

With Operation Twist as part of their new mix, they announced they would sell short-dated and buy long-dated treasuries. This sent the ten-year yield down to 1.72% (yields were already dropping), although as I write it is back up to 1.79%, which without the recent action would be the all-time low. The 30-year is below 3%, at 2.85%, which makes those of us who have been predicting such an event for many years finally right. I think I will just savor the moment and not make any more predictions for a week or so. It was a long time coming. It would have gotten there anyway, even without this Fed action. Which makes what they did impotent and pointless. More below.

However, such low rates are not cause for merriment but for thoughtful pause, as low rates might be good for the government and for those looking for mortgages, but they threaten to wreak havoc on pension plans, as the bond portfolios on which they are built are paying less and less, and that means they are becoming more and more underfunded, and stocks are not helping. The problem pension fund trustees have is that lower yields require them to raise their assumption for future liabilities, which must be discounted at a lower rate. Lower bond yields, like falling share prices, increase funding gaps.

While few are mentioning this aspect, Spencer Jakab of the FT sent me this note: “A sensitivity study by Credit Suisse done in mid-August shows how big an impact this can have. The underfunding for S&P 500 members was then an estimated $390bn. A 25 basis point fall in discount rates would have inflated the deficit to $435bn – about the same as 4 percentage points of investment underperformance this year. In August alone the deficit among the broader S&P 1500 widened by some $75bn, Mercer Consulting found. Slumping equities and bond yields brought the deficit from 12 to 31 per cent since April alone.”

Not to mention what low rates do to people who are trying to live off their savings. How can you survive on 1% yields from a small income portfolio? That means you start reaching for yield in places that are not as safe or liquid, which is precisely what we do NOT want our retirees to be doing. Wrong, wrong, wrong. An unintended consequence of this Fed policy is that retirees are being put at serious risk. And it is an important consequence. So many retirement plans were formed ten years ago, assuming they could safely withdraw 5% a year. Now that is difficult, at least if we’re talking “safely.” There is going to be a plethora of schemes to entice retirees with “safe” higher-yielding investment programs. Please, remember that there are no free lunches. If you are getting above-market yields, you are taking above-market risks.

Now, let’s look at what the Fed is actually likely to do. They have indicated their actions will occur over the next nine months. This also means they will sell most of their short-term treasuries and increase their duration, but not necessarily their risk. It is still US government debt. These projections are from Bridgewater.

Treasuries the Fed will likely sell:

What the Fed Has Likely Sales
0-1 Years $138 $138
1-2 Years $156 $156
2-3 Years $221 $106
Total $515 $400
On average, $400bn at 1.5-year maturity
Treasuries the Fed will likely buy:

Eligible Total Eligible Outstanding Eligible New Issue Likely Purchase
6-7 Years $353 $179 $174 $140
7-10 Years $581 $383 $198 $160
10-30 Years $521 $395 $126 $100
Total $1,455 $957 $498 $400
Rates have already moved in anticipation, as seen below.

One has to go out beyond 5 years to get more than a 1% yield. Who is buying this stuff? Any pension plan doing so is locking in low returns and underfunding for that period. This is just a disaster in the making in the pension and insurance world. If you couple that with a recession, a Muddle Through Economy, and a secular bear market, it is a prescription for a pension-funding train wreck of epic proportions, which means that the large companies will have to start writing checks, which will be a hit on earnings.

Note: Adding to pension concerns about the stock market, the ECRI weekly leading indicator has been down for six of the last seven week. More evidence that we are in for a real slowdown, if not a recession, sooner rather than later. This just in from the Wall Street Journal:

“Providing fresh evidence of weakening global trade, FedEx Corp. said Thursday it is cutting capacity and trimmed its full-year earnings forecast amid weaker demand, mainly due to slowing sales of consumer electronics made in Asia.

“The news comes as a slide in Asian air cargo traffic that started in July has shown no immediate signs of abating. The slowdown extends to the makers of perishable foods, high-end apparel and automotive and industrial parts that fill the holds of planes flown by FedEx and rivals such as United Parcel Service Inc. and Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd.

“‘The consumer just doesn’t have an appetite’ for spending more, Chief Executive Fred Smith said during a post-earnings conference call. As a result, he added, ‘we don’t anticipate a significant peak [shipping season] this year.’” –Bob Sechler of the WSJ

But that’s just it. What happened with QE2? The money went into commodities and stocks (for which Bernanke again took credit), giving us inflation and a good feeling. But the economy, in terms of jobs, hours worked, incomes, and GDP, went south or sideways. Where was the carry-through? I somehow don’t remember that the stock market was part of the dual mandate, yet Bernanke listed its rise among the results of QE2. My bet is that with QE off the table, that will come to be seen as a temporary rise. A sucker’s rally.

And now that we have used that QE bullet, where are we? The stock market is tanking, as are commodities. Bond yields are making new lows. The dollar is getting stronger. Can someone tell me why we went through this exercise? It seems we are right back where we were, yet with even more uncertainty. And now we start something that my Dad would call a piss-ant (a small, rather noxious and foul variety of Texas ant) program called Operation Twist, which has no real hope of doing anything that will help the dual mandate. It simply creates the illusion the Fed is doing something.

I said at the time of the 2nd QE that the main problem I had was that we were wasting a bullet that we would (and now do) need when the next liquidity crisis came. And we have now kicked inflation up. As Rob Arnott wrote me in a private message, when you look at the next four months, which will “drop off” the year-over-year rate of inflation, it’s not pretty. Core could easily run up to more than 2.5%. The Fed may have handcuffed itself at the very time we need some liquidity. QE2 was a very bad and ill-conceived move, as is the current one. It is not smart to mess with Mother Market. (Can anyone say Fisher for Fed Chair?)

The US Government Is in the “No-Money-Down” Mortgage Business

The Fed was very clear in its statement that it wants mortgage rates to go down. But anyone with a pulse knows that the problem in the housing market is not that rates are too high. Dropping rates another 25-50 basis points is not going to help all that much if you can’t get the 20% down you need to finance a house, let alone get a nonconforming loan or, God forbid, a jumbo loan. With banks feeding into the market “REO” homes they get from foreclosures, it will be several years until we get close to a bottom in housing. But new homes are being built. So what gives?

This week I went to a fund presentation on new-home construction and sales. I was invited by a very knowledgeable real estate consulting firm (John Burns), and I was interested to know, how do you raise money in this market for new-home “spec” construction? The numbers and the company sales history they presented looked very impressive, but I could not figure out how they were closing the rather significant number of homes per development they did. No one else I knew of was close, from what I have seen (I watch these things). When the person who presented sat down, I looked at the mailer they send out by the millions. They send it to apartment renters. It says, “Why would you rent an apartment when you can buy a new home for $699 a month with NO MONEY DOWN?” And at very low rates, I might add.

These are starter homes, smaller but quite nice. (Note: a lot larger than the houses I grew up in with three siblings!) But they are on the outskirts of town, and that triggered a thought in the back of my head. Joan McCullough had tipped me to this.

“Are you using USDA financing to get the no-money-down?” The short answer was yes, along with FHA (3% down) and VHA. And what, you may be asking, is USDA financing? And how do I get some?

The USDA is the US Department of Agriculture. They currently have $24 billion they can use for government-guaranteed financing of homes (up from $12 billion last year). This is not Fannie or Freddie, this is the good old US D of A. As in farms and stuff (and food stamps and housing and… basically they got all these odd mandates long ago, when congressional agricultural committees wanted to expand their power). From Real Estate Economy Watch:

“Founded in 1949 to spur home sales and development in rural areas, the US Department of Agriculture’s popular direct and guaranteed rural housing loans today are one of the few places in America you can still get a mortgage with no money down at competitive rates.

“Borrowers don’t have to be lower income; in fact they can make slightly more than the median. To qualify for the government guaranteed loans, borrowers can earn up to 115 percent of the median income for the area. Nor do they have to buy in a rural area. They can live relatively close to a major urban area or in a popular resort community, however qualifying areas were recently redrawn to comply with the program’s rural mandate.

“Best of all, no down payment is needed to get financing through approved lenders, which makes the USDA program more attractive to borrowers who qualify than FHA.” (emphasis mine)

And there are actually subsidies available, so that you might not need to make the entire payment. Now, you can’t use this to buy a McMansion. You have to be in a rural area, which has come to be defined as outside the city limits (except in certain areas). There are income limits. The program does attempt to help lower-income families, and I am not trying to be snarky here, but these are government-guaranteed loans (read: taxpayer-guaranteed) at 100%, being handed out in areas where in the city homes are going into foreclosure and need someone to live in them, yet right outside the city you can buy this cute new home. Which is a situation more or less guaranteed to keep home values down in the rural outskirts, yet we want first-time buyers to snap these up!

The intention here is all well and good. And the buyers are seeing it as a way to reduce their monthly payment, and a house is still the American Dream. And, over time, it will be. If they stay in them long enough and don’t need to move, etc. I just think the unintended consequences (there are those words again, as we’re talking about a government project) are likely to be larger than anyone thinks.

I invite you to go to http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/Home.html. Look around. Notice that 4 of the first 5 press releases on the home page have the words job creation in their titles. Plus a lot of other current buzz words, like energy, environment, etc.

This whole side trip got started with our analysis of the Fed and its recent actions. Let’s quickly return, before moving on to Social Security. This week’s action is not useful. It falls under the category of “Let’s do something to show we know there is a problem.” It will provoke suspicion or opposition among those of a conservative monetary bent, probably hurt small and medium-sized banks (as it drives down the yield curve, which bankers depend on to make money), and lower interest rates for savers.

Crash Alert?

This is from my good friend Art Cashin today (he’s head of floor operations of UBS, and you see him all the time up on CNBC). I thought it should go here, after the market action of the last few days. Just as a heads-up.

“The Thursday/Monday Syndrome – We had suggested yesterday that we should probably explore the history of what old fogey traders refer to as the Thursday/Monday syndrome. While it would be pretensions to say that was prophetic, it was, to say the least, serendipitous, for yesterday’s action looked like the perfect first step in a Thursday/Monday setup.

“We had intended to give you a more thorough history of the syndrome with lots of analytical examples starting with the classic one – October 1929. Unfortunately, events are moving too fast this week, so we have neither the time nor space to wax poetic on the topic. So, you will just have to rely on my recollections of 50 years of watching markets and hundreds of nights studying market history.

“The classic Thursday/Monday syndrome starts with the kind of action we saw yesterday. The markets open under pressure and selling accelerates in swelling volume. By early afternoon, there is a virtual stampede of selling. Then, later in the session, stocks stabilize a bit based on some reassurance. On Thursday, October 23, 1929, that reassurance came in the form of Richard Whitney bidding ‘205 for 10,000 steel’ on behalf of the bankers’ rescue pool. (Read a terrific account in the chapter ‘The Crash’ in Fredrick Lewis Allen’s marvelous and essential ‘Only Yesterday’.)

“The action on Friday (and Saturday in the case of 1929) is uneven, often ending choppily steady or somewhat weaker.

“Then on Monday, the trapdoor opens with liquidation and margin calls bringing tsunamis of selling.

“Is that what’s going to happen? Who knows? If it were that easy, kindergarten kids could do this. But chance favors the prepared mind. Old fogeys will guard against undue risk and exposure. Some may even get out a special shopping list. They will set their basket right, put in silly bids and hope some panicky soul throws a bargain in. Recall the story of the floor messenger boy, who, in 1929, according to legend, bought White Sewing Machine with his silly bid of one dollar when all other bids canceled.

“One final note on the syndrome. Not infrequently, the Monday massacre spills over into Tuesday morning – a capitulation bottom in mid-morning resulting in a massive reversal to the upside.”

Is Social Security a Ponzi?

Breathes there a man with brain so dead
Who never to himself hath said,
“Social Security looks like a Ponzi Scheme?”

- With apologies to Sir Walter Scott

Governor Rick Perry has been getting slammed of late for his comment that Social Security is a Ponzi scheme. Note: This is NOT an endorsement of Perry or any other candidate; it is a segue into the more important issue of Social Security.

Perry is not saying anything that has not been said for over 20 years. I seem to remember that back in my younger days (as in the ’80s) I actually published a book on Ponzis. The classic Ponzi is where you get money from one group and then find another group to pay the “returns” to the first, and so on, until you run out of people and the game is up. The difference between a Ponzi and Social Security is that SS is legal and is done in full view of the public with everyone knowing the deal.

As long as each succeeding generation is willing to pay and is large enough, SS can go on. But now we have trillions in unfunded liabilities. All Perry is suggesting is that we admit the problem and fix it. Not exactly radical or suggesting we end Social Security, as Romney and the others claimed.

(Side note. I found that use of the attack mode disgusting and totally devoid of the leadership I want to see on that stage. It was trying to create a “gotcha” moment. Why not turn it into a teaching moment, to say how you would fix Social Security or admit you have no clue as to the true nature of the problem? Afraid to touch the third rail of Social Security? Then get out of the race. You have no ability to lead this country through what will be a crisis presidency if you can’t even admit to some basic, obvious truths. And how will you even get to the real problem, Medicare?)

Most of the “fixes” are some combination of increasing the retirement age, raising the cap on how much is subject to SS taxes, and/or some form of means testing. Social Security can be fixed if the political will is found to do one or all of those. Some comments on those choices:

First, there is some resistance to means testing, as it would be an admission that Social Security is a form of welfare and not a “savings account” that is in some hidden lock box. By now, anyone with a neuron firing knows there is no lock box and the Social Security funds are an entry into a government accounting book that don’t really exist except as an IOU. Politicians of all stripes have used the Social Security money to pay for other government expenses. Those funds were even counted to offset the deficit, although now that Social Security is no longer in a surplus, that has gone away.

Isn’t that what Ponzi did? He took money from one group, telling them they would get it back later, and then spent the money with another group, telling them the same thing.

OK, think using the term Ponzi is harsh? Some Republican theme? Then let’s quote uber-liberal Paul Krugman from 1996:

“Social Security is structured from the point of view of the recipients as if it were an ordinary retirement plan: what you get out depends on what you put in. So it does not look like a redistributionist scheme. In practice it has turned out to be strongly redistributionist, but only because of its Ponzi game aspect, in which each generation takes more out than it put in. Well, the Ponzi game will soon be over, thanks to changing demographics, so that the typical recipient henceforth will get only about as much as he or she put in (and today’s young may well get less than they put in).”

Let me say, I am all for Social Security. While I supplement my mother’s income, her Social Security check is very important to her. Not enough to live on, but every bit helps. (I have friends whose parents’ sole income is Social Security, and I totally get how small it is in today’s world.)

I also have seven kids. Hopefully, most or all of them will not need Social Security when they retire in 40-50 years. But some might. I want it to be there for them if they need it. But if we don’t properly fix it, it won’t be. I want it fixed.

I turn 62 next month. I am eligible for Social Security. I have paid in a lot of money over the last 45 years of working, for the last 20 years at the max level (with some off years here and there). Am I “due” something? Based on the current law, I am. But I must confess that life has been good of late (there have been times when I thought I would need every penny of Social Security!).

I think Social Security should be means tested. We should recognize it for what it is, for what Krugman called it: a redistributionist scheme. And a good and necessary one from the perspective of civilized society. Means testing would go a long ways to “fixing” the problem. But it doesn’t get us there.

We need to raise the retirement age, and by more than a few years. And this is where I get called a heartless (insert expletive)! “How could you want us to work until 70 or even later? How can we do that? Is that fair?”

Let’s use as our model that icon of the left, the King of Compassion, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR). He created the Social Security Act in 1935. He put the retirement age at 65. From today’s perspective, that seems about right, if not a little early. But what did it look like back then? I refer you to a report from the US Senate in 2006 on life expectancy in the US. Interesting reading, but for our purposes we will scroll down to page 26 and the detailed life-expectancy tables. (http://aging.senate.gov/crs/aging1.pdf)

In 1900, the average life expectancy was 47 years (shockingly, the life expectancy for black males was only 32). By 1930 it was 59, which, if they kept such records then, would have been what they were looking at when the designed Social Security. In 1935 it had risen to 61.

So FDR set the retirement age four years above the average life expectancy. So much for compassion. He (they) assumed you would work into what was for them advanced old age. Today, 62 does not seem all that old (at least from my vantage point!). Look around – there are lots of people in their 60s and 70s with very active lifestyles.

Why is that? Let’s fast-forward. In 2003 life expectancy was up to 77. Today it is 79 and change. Life expectancy has been rising more or less steadily rate at about 1 year for every 4 years of the calendar. So that means that in 40 years life expectancy, if it continues as it has, will be around 90. Under today’s laws one could retire at 62 or 65 or 67 and, if you just lived an average lifespan, get far more in benefits than you paid in. Remember, 90 will just be the average.

So when someone suggests that we move the retirement age to (gasp!) 70 in a few decades, I just smile and think back to what FDR would do. If Social Security had been set up to track life expectancy in 1935, when it was formed, then retirement would be set at 83 or 84 today! Not exactly the golden-years concept, is it?

Catastrophic Success

But then we come to what I call Catastrophic Success. Advances in medicine and biotech in the next 10 and then 20 years are going to radically alter life expectancy. Alzheimer’s disease will be gone. I will tell you about a potential cure for cirrhosis of the liver (and all kinds of cirrhosis) in a future letter. Heart disease? Soon be something that can be dealt with. Diabetes? Will be controlled or gone.

And cancer? There are numerous approaches, but I am following one that will be in human trials next year and that, in numerous mice studies, shows the potential to be a silver bullet for cancer in general, and relatively inexpensive (not a public company).

I could go on and on, but the point is that this Boomer generation is not going to live up to its part of the generational Social Security bargain. We are not going to die on time in anything close to the actuarial certainty the government now assumes (nor do the private pension funds!). Short of a Soylent Green-type debacle, Boomers will not only break the deal, they may destroy it, if we do not tie Social Security to the average lifespan.

Health care will soon be a Catastrophic Success. Wildly successful from the point of view of the individual, but a catastrophe from the point of view of Social Security. And we are debating whether to raise the retirement age from 67 to maybe 70 at some distant time in the future?

We need to be raising the retirement age by one year every four years. That means in 20 years the retirement age needs to be five years higher. I can hear the screams and moans from those 45 and under. 

“What a heartless [insert expletive] Mauldin is. How long does he think I should have to work? It is all well and good for him,” etc.

I want the Social Security system to be there for my kids in 40 years. And not dealing with the rapid age increase is one way to make sure it is not. OK, I will offer a way to retire earlier. If you agree to forego any new medical treatments introduced after, say, 2014, then I will say you get to retire at the current SS levels. Like that trade? I didn’t think so.

Think I am being overly optimistic about lifespan? I am not even close. I am having a small private dinner in a few weeks with Mr. Optimistic Future himself, Ray Kurzweil (among other books, he wrote The Singularity Is Near – a very important work on the waves rolling toward us from the future). We will talk of many things, and I hope to get him to contribute to my next book, The Millennium Wave, which is all about how the world will look in 20 years. If we stay on his track, then shortly after that time (by 2032) we will be regenerating the entire human body. Ray (and many others) see a path to humans living to 150 and beyond, in good health, with younger bodies. It doesn’t make you immortal. You can still look the wrong way and step in front of a London bus or climb the wrong mountain and fall off. (Note: Ray does see a path to immortality of a sort, when we can download our minds into machines and then reverse the trip. But that’s a whole different level of discussion and farther down the road.)

I am talking to scientists who are doing the human trials on the first real regeneration of a human organ, the cardiovascular system. How about a 50-year warranty on your new heart and cardio system? Then it’s on to the next organ system. One down, 203 to go. (Start with cardio, as it’s the easiest to deliver the targeted stem cell to.) Sadly, it will be done in Asia and not in the US, so we lose tens of thousands of high-paying jobs and don’t get to train a cadre to physicians on how to do it. Nothing against Asia, but this is US-developed technology … that would take five years to get through the FDA. For the management team of the company doing the work, who really do hate the concept of people dying from old age, that’s too many deaths as a result of waiting. And there is still a long way to go before we get true regeneration. We (as in those of us over 60) won’t have time for 20th-century regulators to get in the way. The clock is ticking.

(Side note for those of you who don’t want to live a very long time: I am sorry your life is so boring. I see nothing but wonder and new worlds to explore and cultures to find and tens of thousands of books to read. Ask me in a few thousand years how it’s going. I’m in no hurry to knock on the gates of the Other Side. We get there soon enough.)

Social Security as it is set up today is close enough to a Ponzi scheme for government work. That can be changed, but we have to have the will to do so. Let’s hope that not just Perry can decide to lead us there.

Europe and Breaking the Light Speed Barrier

Heads up, you Junior Rocket Man Kids (remember those days?). Physicists are doing amazing things. My son Trey and I got a private tour this summer of CERN, the great physics lab in Geneva. Very cool. But Wall Street is also legendary for the number of physicists it hires to work on high-frequency trading programs. Evidently, they have figured out how to get trades done 190 milliseconds in the future. Is the race on to see who can cross the one-day mark? What is the speed of light when compared to the speed of money?

“Nanex: On September 15, 2011, beginning at 12:48:54.600, there was a time warp in the trading of Yahoo! (YHOO) stock. HFT has reached speeds faster than the speed-of-light, allowing time travel into the future. Up to 190 milliseconds into the future, or 0.19 fantaseconds is the record so far. It all happened in just over one second of trading, the evidence buried under an avalanche of about 19,000 quotes and 3,000 individual trade executions. The facts of the matter are indisputable. Based on official UQDF/UTDF exchange timestamps, there is unmistakable proof that YHOO trades were executed on quotes that didn’t exist until 190 milliseconds later!” (http://www.nanex.net/Research/fantaseconds/fantaseconds.html)

Going forward in time is cool, and the same day I got the above notice I read that the physicists at CERN and in Italy have found subatomic particles that move slightly faster than the speed of light, making it possible to travel back in time (only a few nanoseconds, but it’s a start):

“But now it seems that researchers working in one of the world’s largest physics laboratories, under a mountain in central Italy, have recorded particles travelling at a speed that is supposedly forbidden by Einstein’s theory of special relativity.

“Scientists at the Gran Sasso facility will unveil evidence on Friday that raises the troubling possibility of a way to send information back in time, blurring the line between past and present and wreaking havoc with the fundamental principle of cause and effect.

“Researchers on the Opera (Oscillation Project with Emulsion-tRacking Apparatus) experiment recorded the arrival times of ghostly subatomic particles called neutrinos sent from Cern on a 730km journey through the Earth to the Gran Sasso lab.” (http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2011/sep/22/faster-than-light-particles-neutrinos?newsfeed=true)

Now, just in case you buy this (and if you did, contact me about a bridge I have), let me attempt to disappoint. First, as my curmudgeon PhD from MIT and VC friend Bart Stuck writes, “I think they both had time-stamp errors.” I can’t vouch for the Swiss and Italians, but I would bet the keys to the kingdom that there is a computer glitch at the NYSE. High-frequency trading (HFT) is distorting the markets. It is enriching a few pockets (and that of the exchange), and I simply do not see how it is in the interest of the public to allow it.

I also know that fighting HFT is spitting into the wind, as faster tech comes along every few months. If you force the HFT funds to put their servers across the street (losing the time advantage of not being co-located with the exchange servers – milliseconds count!), it will only be a few years until technology has given the edge back to them. In ten years, when artificial intelligence and connection speeds are far more advanced, how will human traders compete? Hire yet another AI to fight back? Wire yourself into the system (already being done, by the way, in rudimentary ways)?

The only way to effectively end HFT is for the exchanges to stop giving incentives for such trading. I can see the profits for the traders and the exchanges. I just don’t see the benefit to the rest of us. The SEC should step in and settle some hash over missed time stamps. If a small broker-dealer has a wrong time stamp, they are all over us, and you can bet there are fines. Something is wrong here. If one trade can go “back to the future” then how many more? Really? A one-off or a symptom? And to finish this on a light note, here’s a cartoon from my favorite cartoonist, Gary Larson.

It is getting close to time to hit the send button. It has been good to be home for almost seven weeks and let my body recharge, and spend more time with my kids and grandkids. Life is not easy for all of them at times. Poor Lively (perfect angel that she is) was getting a “spanking” as I left for the airport. I can’t imagine her doing anything naughty, but her mother (Tiffani) thought otherwise. Two of the adult kids needed some help. It is never the same two at the same time. And on and on.

This trip should be fun. I love London. And I’ll be in Malta with my European partner, Niels Jensen of Absolute Return Partners. I will be hosting CNBC Squawk Box on Wednesday in London. Then it’s on to Dublin and lots of meetings, as I try to get a handle on the crisis there (my first trip to Ireland). And a little time driving through the Irish countryside, on our way to Galway. Then to Geneva to be with friends and clients for two days as I turn 62. First, dinner with the always fascinating Lord Alex Bridport (the only lord I know, so I love applying that title) and then a birthday dinner hosted by Herwig van Hove of Notz Stucki. And then it’s back home to Texas.

In four weeks I head to Cape Town, South Africa, where I will speak at the Momentum Wealth Investment Summit, and then, back in Texas, I’ll speak November 6 for a charity fund-raising event sponsored by Hedge Funds Care, a wonderful group that raises money for children’s causes. You can learn more by going to http://www.hedgefundscare.org/event.asp?eventID=74. I hope to see you there!

Have a great week and enjoy the weather if you can. The forecast for Europe is beautiful.

Your wondering if he’ll find his Irish ancestors analyst,

John Mauldin

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