Friday, June 17, 2011

WHY WE BELIEVE WE ARE IN A SECULAR BEAR MARKET

By Comstock Partners

Looking back at the long history of the U.S. stock market it is clear that there are long periods when the trend is distinctly up or down. We call these long trend “secular” markets as opposed to the commonly-known cyclical market trends that last about four years on average. In our view we are currently in a secular bear market that began when the market peaked over 11 years ago in early 2000.

The most powerful secular bull market took place in the 18-year period from 1982 to 2000. In this period the market rose from 777 on the DJIA to almost 12,000 (16% compounded/year); the S&P 500 from about 100 to 1550 (16% compounded/year); and the NASDAQ from about 160 to 5050 (22% compounded/year). Although there were two other powerful secular bull markets such as the periods from 1921 to 1929 and 1949 to 1966, the bull market of 1982 to 2000 was the most significant by far.
S&P 500
Nasdaq Composite

Dow Industrials
The last half-decade of the 1982-2000 advance was accompanied by arguably the most spectacular financial mania of all time. Stocks, most often in the technology sector, typically went public and tripled on the first day of trading. The so-called dot.com stocks often had no earnings while others were merely concepts that didn’t even have revenues. To justify the ridiculous prices of these stocks, analysts came up with new and untried metrics such as the number of eye balls that were viewing or would be viewing their websites rather than fundamentals such as earnings or cash flow.

Starting in the late 1990s Comstock constantly warned clients how sick the mania had become. We did this through lengthy bi-monthly reports in print and later through brief comments on our website. Although we were too early, our judgment was finally vindicated for all of the right reasons once the stock market finally peaked in early 2000. At that time we were convinced that the market was entering a secular bear market that would last for many years. The combination of the extremely powerful 1982-2000 bull market accompanied by a senseless financial mania was the recipe for the start of the secular bear market we envisioned.

You would have to think this secular bear market would be extremely severe with the combination of a major bull market followed by a financial mania. The market did decline by about 50% but the powers that be did whatever possible to delay or reverse the secular bear. Fed Chairman Greenspan tried to stop the severe stock market decline by lowering the Fed Funds rate to 1% in mid 2003 and keeping it at that level for a year. This move stopped the bear market in its tracks. The low rate enabled home prices to accelerate to the upside, and congress jumped in to help the Fed with the rescue by passing every law they could to make it easy for virtually anyone to buy a home.

This started the housing market on a tear (or bubble) since anyone who wanted to buy a home was able to do so by putting up little, or no money. Many of these loans were called “no doc” loans which meant that there was no documentation (like annual salary) required in order to get the mortgages approved. This caused a housing mania that was exacerbated when investment banks packaged the loans and sold them to their clients. They wound up selling packages of very poor quality mortgages (sub-prime) called “collateralized debt obligations” (CDOs) and convinced the rating agencies (who were paid by Wall Street) to rate these “securitized mortgages” AAA. To make things worse, most of the brokerage firms that understood the toxicity of these CDOs protected themselves by buying “credit default swaps”, which were paid off when the loans defaulted.

Now, if the most significant bull market in U.S. history, that drove the stock market to “nose bleed” levels, followed by a dot com financial mania wasn’t enough to start the secular bear market, what would? Well the market did drop by about 50% in 2000-2003 and was on its way to completing the secular bear. But, when the Fed induced a housing market mania accompanied by a cyclical bull market in stocks (within a secular bear) you would think that when the secular bear resumed it would be more severe and deeper. So far, it did produce another 50% decline in the stock market in 2008 and early 2009 as a credit crisis in 2007 caused the worst recession since the Great Depression.

The major 50% decline in the market also fit the same path as Japan as one of our “special reports” discussed in 12/2/2010 “Is America Following the Same Path as Japan?” Japan “hit the wall” after experiencing a similar stock market move from 1972 when the Nikkei 225 was trading about 2000 until the end of 1989 when it reached over 39,000 (18% compounded/year). If you recall it was in the late 1980s when everyone believed that Japan would take over all the manufacturing in the world. At one time the U.S. had a robust TV industry until Japan essentially took over the industry and made virtually every U.S. TV in the late 1980s. This move up in Japan was driven by excesses in the non-financial corporate debt side. That was when Japan corporations bought Pebble Beach and Rockefeller Center and anything else that was for sale. Japan paid the price for the excess debt- driven bull market that drove the Nikkei to almost 40,000 and now is under 10,000 over two decades later.
Nikkei 225
The key 18 year bull market we experienced here in the U.S. ending in 2000 was driven by excesses in household debt. Although wage growth had flattened out, consumers wanted a larger home, a nicer car, and nicer clothes whether they could afford it or not. If they ran out of money with their credit cards and bank loans they would take out a second mortgage on their homes that they felt could never decline in value. Household savings rates, which usually averaged about 9%, fell to near zero. Household debt as a percentage of GDP generally averaged about 50% of GDP and 65% of personal disposable income (PDI). However, starting in the early 1980s (as the stock market started this amazing bull market run discussed earlier) household debt rose to 100% of GDP and 130% of PDI by 2008.
Once the secular bear market started in 2000 we were convinced that the U.S. public had learned their lesson and would start to pay down their debt and begin saving again. We were wrong. After Greenspan lowered rates and started another financial mania driven by home values and the stock market, we were again convinced that the public couldn’t be fooled again. However, after enormous bailouts of the largest financial institutions in the country, as well as the auto industry, and even more monetary ease than in 2003 (accompanied by TARP, the stimulus plan, QE, and QE2); we started another cyclical bull market within the secular bear market. The stock market went from severely oversold in March of 2009 to gaining 100% from those levels. We are convinced that, after the latest 100% rally since March of 2009, that this was the last time the public could be fooled again. And this time we are able to determine that consumers are saving more and consuming less; we believe this change in attitude will continue for a long period of time, creating severe headwinds against strong economic growth.

The most important question to ask yourself is, “can we have another major bull market in U.S. stocks anytime in the near future?” We believe the answer is a resounding “NO”! Just look at what took place in Japan after their stock market and economy “hit the wall” at the end of 1989. The private sector corporate debt that was primarily responsible for the most significant bull market in Japan’s history continued deleveraging for decades. Government debt rose in order to replace the shrinking of the non-financial corporate debt (the debt that drove their bull market) that was either defaulted on or paid off. If the non financial corporate debt drove the market up during their great bull market, it only makes sense that their stock market (Nikkei 225) would decline as the deleveraging process was taking place. And that is exactly what has been taking place for the past 21 years (since 1989) as the Nikkei declined from almost 40,000 to under 10,000 where it is presently. We also note that during the past two decades Japan’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of only 1%.

Why would we expect any different outcome in the United States as the household debt sector (the main sector that rose and drove the U.S. bull market of the 80s and 90s and also continued adding to the debt as the housing market took off from 2003 to 2007) is still in the process of deleveraging since 2007? That is just a little over 4 years, and we can expect a continuation of deleveraging for many years to come-we have a long way to go in order to get back to the levels of household debt relative to GDP or Personal Disposable Income (PDI). (See attached below)
The U.S. stock market will not be able to rise in a sustained manner if we are correct in believing that U.S. households will continue deleveraging for the next few years to as many as 10 more years. The key is that household debt will have to decline to the levels of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s of 50% of GDP and 65% of PDI. That would mean the weak consumption will continue and that should lead to disappointing economic growth. The average growth in consumption over many years grew at about 3% and over the past 13 quarter’s consumption only grew by about ½% per year-that is the lowest growth rate since the Great Depression.
So the next question is, “How will the deleveraging affect the economy? And how will a weak economy affect corporate earnings? “ If the deleveraging affects the U.S. economy the way Japan’s deleveraging affected their economy over the past 21 years, it will clearly be highly negative for U.S economic growth. Since GDP growth and profits are positively correlated over time that should negatively affect corporate earnings that have driven the stock market up for the past couple of years.

Now that operating earnings estimates for the S&P 500 have risen to the record levels of $100 again, we suspect that the deleveraging and weak economy will affect this estimate in a similar vein as in 2008, when S&P 500 earnings estimates were over $108 as into May of that year. Actual earnings came in at less than $50 for operating earnings and less than $15 for “reported” earnings.

The bottom line is that we expect U.S. stocks market to stay in the secular bear market that started in 2000 for many years to come. We believe that main factor that drove the most significant bull market in U.S. stock market history (household debt that enabled unrestricted consumption of everything from goods and services to homes) will reverse and continue the deleveraging process that will more than likely continue for a very long time. This deleveraging will act to affect the stock market in the exact opposite manner as the leveraging did in the bull market. To quantify this, if we were to look at historical household debt relative to GDP and DPI we would expect the debt to be in the area of about $7 to $7.5 trillion. Instead this debt rose to about $14.5 trillion at the peak in 2008. We expect this debt to fall below $10 trillion. That could take many years and be very painful for our economy and stock market.

Goldman, JP Morgan Have Now Become A Commodity Cartel As They Slowly Recreate De Beers' Diamond Monopoly


About a month ago we reported on an inquiry launched into JPM's "anti-competitive" and "monopolistic" practices on the LME which have resulted in artificially high prices for a series of commodities which had been hoarded by the Too Big To Fail bank. Today, the WSJ continues this investigation into a practice that is not insular to JPM but also includes Goldman Sachs and "other owners of large metals warehouses" which can simplistically be characterized as a De Beers-like attempt to artificially keep prices high for commodities such as aluminum, courtesy of warehousing massive excess supply, artificially low market distribution of the final product, while collecting exorbitant rents in the process. Specifically, "Goldman, through its Metro International Trade Services unit, owns the biggest warehouse complex in the LME system, a series of 19 buildings in Detroit that house about a quarter of the aluminum stored in LME facilities. Coca-Cola and other consumers say that Metro in particular is allowing the minimum amount of aluminum allowed by the LME—1,500 metric tons a day—to leave its facilities, and that Metro could remove much more, erasing supply bottlenecks and lowering premiums for physical delivery in the process. Coca-Cola, which has complained to the LME, says it can take months to get the metal the company needs, even though warehouses are allowing aluminum to come in much more quickly. Warehouses, meantime, collect rent and other fees." It is not only Goldman's Metro operations, but includes JP Morgan's Henry Bath division, and naturally commodities behemoth Glencore, all of which are taking advantage of the LME's guidelines and rules which make the imposition of a pseudo-monopoly an easy task. The primary driver of this anti-competitive behavior is the fact that GS, JPM and Glencore now control virtually the entire inventory bottlenecking pathways: "In recent years, major investment banks like Goldman and J.P. Morgan and commodities houses like Glencore have been snapping up warehouses around the world, turning the industry from a disperse grouping of independent operators into another arm of Wall Street. The LME has licensed about 600 warehouses around the world. The transformation has raised questions about whether the investment banks, which also have big commodity-trading arms, are able to use their position as owners of warehouses to manipulate prices to their advantage."And since the outcome of this anti-competitive delayed tolling collusion ends up having quite an inflationary impact on end prices, the respective administrations are more than happy to turn a blind eye to this market dominant behavior which buffers the impact of deflation on input costs. We may have seen the end of the OPEC cartel. Alas, it has been replaced with a far more vicious one - this one having Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan as its two key members.
The warehousing issue alarmed one trader enough to seek government intervention. Anthony Lipmann, managing director of metals trader Lipmann Walton & Co. Ltd., gave evidence to the U.K. House of Commons Select Committee in May 2011, raising concern about large banks and trading houses owning facilities that store other people's metal.

The U.K.'s Office of Fair Trading dismissed concerns that ownership of warehouses gives certain market players an unfair advantage, saying on Tuesday that there were no "obvious competition issues that would merit further investigation at this stage."

Goldman's Detroit warehouse holds about 1.15 million tons out of a total 4.62 million tons in LME-approved warehouses.

Since Goldman bought Metro early last year, the wait time for aluminum delivery in Detroit has increased to about seven months.

Metro charges its customers 42 cents a day for storing one metric ton of aluminum in Detroit, which is about the industry average. At 900,000 tons in the warehouses, Goldman is earning $378,000 a day on rental costs, or about $79 million in seven months.

"Warehouses are making a lot more money," said Jorge Vazquez, managing director of aluminum at Harbor Commodity Research. Goldman is "really the winner clearly, because if you want to take metal away from the location, you have to wait up to 10 months to get your metal out, and in the meantime you're paying rent."
While the obvious purpose of "warehousing" is nothing short of artificially bottlenecking primary supply, these same warehouses have no problem with acquiring all the product created by primary producers in real time, and not releasing it into general circulation: once again, a tactic used by De Beers for decades to keep the price of diamonds artificially high. But unlike De Beers, Goldman also gets to charge rental fees once demand delivery instructions are sent out. The rent ends up being substantial due to the firm's unwillingness to release handily available product to the market in due course:
Metro, meantime, is taking in metal. Metro also offers cash incentives to producers like Rio Tinto Alcan to store their metal in Metro's sheds for contracted periods, sometimes as much as $150 a ton, according to traders.

Once the metal is in the warehouse, the producers sell ownership to this metal on the open market. The new owner can't collect his metal for seven months because of the bottleneck. For that period, the new owner is stuck paying rent to Metro.

"The system is set up like a funnel, so you can dump large amounts of metal in the front end and only get a little out at the back end," said David Wilson, director of metals research at Société Générale SA. "It enables a situation where the rules of the warehousing system are taken advantage of."
Another beneficiary of this monopoly behavior of course are the actual metal producers, which benefit from this illegal and conflicted "middleman" intervention:
Aside from warehouses, producers of the metal are benefiting, because they are able to charge more for their metal. Klaus Kleinfeld, chief executive of Alcoa Inc., said in an interview that supply-and-demand factors are leading prices higher.
Yet it is not even Goldman or JPM's fault: after all they are merely following the guidelines set up by the LME:
"You can't blame the warehouses," Mr. Kleinfeld said.

U.S. aluminum sheet maker Novelis sent a letter to the LME in May "expressing concerns" about the warehousing situation, a company spokesman said.

The complaints led the LME to commission an independent study into the issue last July. That study recommended a sliding scale be adopted, rather than the fixed minimum of 1,500 tons a day. That would result in larger warehouse complexes being required to release more metal.

It effectively doubles the minimum amount required to be relinquished by Metro each day. The ruling would go into effect in April. The LME board on Thursday, however, failed to reach a consensus on the recommendations.
While warehousing used to be a last resort market at inception, it has now become, courtesy of the economies of scale of the middlemen, the "go-to" market, which makes any normal market clearing impossible.
Because should true market clearing be allowed, the prices for everything from aluminum to copper would plunge immediately:
The situation is made more aggravating for metal consumers because supply has far outweighed demand for most of the last decade, and there is more than 4.5 million metric tons of surplus metal stored in LME's warehouse system.
Alas as pointed out previously, with the exchanges ultimately merely conforming to the bidding of their host ponzi scheme governments, which will happily allow even further consolidation of warehousing facilities by the trio in order to artificially boost inflation ever higher, the final product is a vicious loop in which everyone benefits...Everyone but the end consumer of course, who is faced with an anti-competitive system controlled by a handful of Fed-funded players. 

And with China unlikely to open up sales of its own warehouses (especially since Chinese vendors are now well-known to use physical copper in storage to write letters of credit against for speculative purposes) to the market, the system will persevere until such time as global inflationary powers are finally destroyed and there is a scramble to dump inventories. Like what happened in the fall of 2008. At that point just as the status quo drives prices higher, so the unwind will result in a massive undershoot of prices from fair values. Which in turn will allow those insatiable importers of commoditized product such as China to feel like your typical mortgage-free living American at a K-mart blue light special. But of course we don't have to worry about that, because the central planners will never allow the system to implode like it did in 2008. After all that would defeat the whole purpose of central planning... 

In the meantime, good luck to anyone who wishes to break the cartel's monopoly in the aluminum, copper or any other commodity.

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China Makes The Case for Silver (Guest Post)


I am on record calling the silver market a Hunt Brothers type of market a few days before the market crashed. Well, it has happened. After soaring to a peak of $49.79 per ounce on 26 April, the silver price crashed to a low of $33.01 on 18 May.

With silver trading at a notch below $35, the question is....where to now?

In my analysis of the platinum market I compared the platinum price after the Tohoku quake in March this year to the platinum price after the Kobe quake in 1995. I did the same with the silver price, and wow, see what emerged!


Sources: I-Net Bridge: Plexus Asset Management.

The silver price reverted to the levels prior to the Tohoku disaster and has since tracked the price movements of the Kobe disaster. It is most interesting to note that the silver price took off a few days after Japan’s twin disaster. Why? I ask myself.


Sources: I-Net Bridge: Plexus Asset Management.

The only argument I can come up with is that sudden demand caught the market seriously short. This sudden demand could have emanated from the crisis in the MENA region as the affluent people in those countries took refuge in silver as a store of value that they could move across borders.

In addition to that, investors probably took fright at the jump in energy prices as a result of the MENA situation and rushed into the silver market. I think the earthquake in Japan perhaps led to fears that silver scrap recovery could also be severely hampered as the annual scrap recovery is equivalent to 29% of annual mining production.

Sources: CPM; Silver Institute; Plexus Asset Management.

It seems to me that, as in the case of industrial metals, the outlook for silver is heavily dependent on China. China’s fabrication demand for silver amounted to 21% of world fabrication demand ex coins last year. The country’s fabrication demand over the past five years has grown in line with the GDP at a rate of 11% per year.

At a growth rate of 9% per year it means that China’s fabrication demand will swell by 88 million ounces from the current 163 million to 251 million ounces by 2015. Mining production over the past five years has grown by 4% per year. If I assume that the growth rate will be maintained, it means the country’s mining production will rise by 22 million ounces from 98 million ounces in 2010 to 120 million ounces by 2015. A net shortfall of 66 million ounces! Yes, that excludes scrap recovery and investment demand.

Sources: CPM; Silver Institute; Plexus Asset Management.


Sources: CPM; CFLP; Li & Fung: Plexus Asset Management.

China used to be a net exporter of silver in the past mainly due to sales from government stockpiles. The situation was reversed in 2007, though, and the country’s imports are currently around 11% of total world supply.

From my research a very interesting fact came to the fore. The CPM Group’s seasonality index for silver has a very close relationship with the seasonality of China’s CFLP manufacturing PMI! That explains the importance of China in the world silver market.

U.S. Manufacturing: V-shaped Recovery Before A New Growth Cycle? (Guest Post)


Although job openings in the U.S. manufacturing sector slipped slightly in April to 230,000 from 235,000 in March, they have remained above 200,000 for four straight months for the first time since the summer of 2008 (see chart, data here.)

From the recessionary lows of 100,000 through mid-2009, manufacturing job openings have more than doubled to levels not seen since the summer of 2009, two years ago. We can expect ongoing improvements in America's manufacturing sector, both in terms of output and employment, as it continues to remain at the forefront of the economy recovery

In another sign of a strong economic recovery in the manufacturing sector, the after-tax profits of U.S. manufacturing corporations reached a record-high $144.5 billion in the first quarter of 2011, according to data released today by the Census Bureau.

Adjusted for inflation, first quarter profits this year were 6.6% ahead of the previous quarter, and 28.7% ahead of a year earlier. Compared to the pre-recession level of $124.1 billion in the fourth quarter of 2007, manufacturing profits have increased by 16.2% and $20.4 billion.
Another chart (below) shows annual real manufacturing output per worker from 1947-2010 using data from the BEA for manufacturing output by industry and data from the BLS on manufacturing employment.

In 1950, the average U.S. manufacturing employee produced $19,600 (in 2010 dollars) of output, and by 1976 the amount of output per worker had doubled to $38,500. During that period manufacturing productivity was growing annually at 2.63%.
Output per worker doubled again to $75,000 by 1997 (21 years later), as productivity per worker increased to 3.23%. Manufacturing output per worker approximately doubled again to $149,000 by 2010, but it only took 13 years because worker productivity accelerated to 5.42% during this period.

This is an amazing story of huge increases in U.S. worker productivity in the manufacturing sector. In fact, the growth in manufacturing worker productivity more than doubled from 2.63% per year in the period between 1950 and mid-1970s to 5.42% annually between 1997 and 2010. Whereas it took 26 years for output per worker to double during the first period (1950-1976), it only took 13 years during the more recent period (1997-2010).

Manufacturing workers in America keep getting more and more productive, which then allows us to produce more and more output over time, with fewer and fewer workers. That's a great story about an American industry that is healthy, successful and thriving, and not an industry in decline.

By continually increasing worker productivity and productive efficiency, the American manufacturing sector has been hugely successful at achieving one of the most important economic outcomes of being able to "produce more with less." In the process, those efficiency and productivity gains have helped conserve scarce resources, including human resources, more effectively than almost any other industry, except maybe farming.

It's hard to overstate how much the efficiency gains achieved by U.S. manufacturing have contributed to the improvements in our standard of living by making manufactured goods more affordable over time. We should spend less time complaining about fewer workers in manufacturing, and more time celebrating the phenomenal gains in manufacturing worker productivity.

In 2009, the U.S. produced $2.33 trillion of manufacturing output including mining and utilities, according to data from the United Nations. The U.S. ranked #1 in the world for manufacturing, and produced 14% more output than second-ranked China ($2.04 trillion) and twice as much output as third-ranked Japan ($1.15 trillion).
What's most impressive is that the U.S. produced almost as much manufacturing output as the manufacturing sectors of Germany (#4), Italy (#5), France (#6), Russia (#7), U.K. (#8), Brazil (#9) and Canada (#10) combined ($2.44 trillion).

We are constantly hammered with bad news about the decline in the number of manufacturing jobs in the U.S., but we never hear the good news about why that is happening:

I think we can now safely say that the profitability of the U.S. manufacturing sector has made a complete and total V-shaped recovery from the effects of the U.S. recession and global slowdown, and is now well-prepared and situated for a new cycle of growth and expansion in output, sales, jobs, R&D, and capital investment.

The Second Dot Com Bubble Has Now Burst


It is hard to believe that the first dot com bubble, so vivid to most semi-veteran traders, occurred over a decade ago. What is even harder to believe is that courtesy of the record liquidity bubble created by the Central Planning mafia, 2011 has already seen not only the second dot com bubble, but as the table below demonstrates, its bursting. Of all the dot com 2.0 IPO to hit the market in the past 3 months, the average return is now down 20%, but that has not prevented an underwriting syndicate comprised of the TBTFs to make billions in underwriting fees. Luckily, the fervor that previously had gripped some of the more volatile precious metals, and since spilled over into new public issues, has popped. Incremental cash will now be nearly impossible to get. To all companies that managed to take advantage of momo traders who have a memory of 15 minutes or less, congratulations. To everyone else: get in line for QE3. Wink, wink Groupon.



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Treasury Yield Snapshot: After the Head Fake

by dshort.com

Quick take: Yesterday's pop in yields looks like it was a head fake. Today stocks plummeted and Treasuries rallied. The ten-year yield, which jumped 11 basis points yesterday, fell 13 today to close again below 3% at 2.98.

The behavior of Treasuries is an area of special interest in light of the Fed's second round of quantitative easing, which was formally announced on November 3rd. The first chart shows the percent change for a basket of eight Treasuries since November 4th.

The next chart shows the daily performance of several Treasuries and the Fed Funds Rate (FFR) since 2007.

The source for the yields is the Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates from the US Department of the Treasury and the New York Fed's website for the FFR.


Here's a closer look at the past year with the 30-year fixed mortgage added to the mix (excluding points).

Here's a comparison of the yield curve at three points in time: 1) the Fed's QE2 announcement, 2) the February interim high for the 7, 10, 20 and 30-year yields 3) and the latest curve.

The next chart shows the 2- and 10-year yields with the 2-10 spread highlighted in the background.

The final chart is an overlay of the CBOE Interest Rate 10-Year Treasury Note (TNX) and the S&P 500.


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