Friday, June 17, 2011

Goldman, JP Morgan Have Now Become A Commodity Cartel As They Slowly Recreate De Beers' Diamond Monopoly


About a month ago we reported on an inquiry launched into JPM's "anti-competitive" and "monopolistic" practices on the LME which have resulted in artificially high prices for a series of commodities which had been hoarded by the Too Big To Fail bank. Today, the WSJ continues this investigation into a practice that is not insular to JPM but also includes Goldman Sachs and "other owners of large metals warehouses" which can simplistically be characterized as a De Beers-like attempt to artificially keep prices high for commodities such as aluminum, courtesy of warehousing massive excess supply, artificially low market distribution of the final product, while collecting exorbitant rents in the process. Specifically, "Goldman, through its Metro International Trade Services unit, owns the biggest warehouse complex in the LME system, a series of 19 buildings in Detroit that house about a quarter of the aluminum stored in LME facilities. Coca-Cola and other consumers say that Metro in particular is allowing the minimum amount of aluminum allowed by the LME—1,500 metric tons a day—to leave its facilities, and that Metro could remove much more, erasing supply bottlenecks and lowering premiums for physical delivery in the process. Coca-Cola, which has complained to the LME, says it can take months to get the metal the company needs, even though warehouses are allowing aluminum to come in much more quickly. Warehouses, meantime, collect rent and other fees." It is not only Goldman's Metro operations, but includes JP Morgan's Henry Bath division, and naturally commodities behemoth Glencore, all of which are taking advantage of the LME's guidelines and rules which make the imposition of a pseudo-monopoly an easy task. The primary driver of this anti-competitive behavior is the fact that GS, JPM and Glencore now control virtually the entire inventory bottlenecking pathways: "In recent years, major investment banks like Goldman and J.P. Morgan and commodities houses like Glencore have been snapping up warehouses around the world, turning the industry from a disperse grouping of independent operators into another arm of Wall Street. The LME has licensed about 600 warehouses around the world. The transformation has raised questions about whether the investment banks, which also have big commodity-trading arms, are able to use their position as owners of warehouses to manipulate prices to their advantage."And since the outcome of this anti-competitive delayed tolling collusion ends up having quite an inflationary impact on end prices, the respective administrations are more than happy to turn a blind eye to this market dominant behavior which buffers the impact of deflation on input costs. We may have seen the end of the OPEC cartel. Alas, it has been replaced with a far more vicious one - this one having Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan as its two key members.
The warehousing issue alarmed one trader enough to seek government intervention. Anthony Lipmann, managing director of metals trader Lipmann Walton & Co. Ltd., gave evidence to the U.K. House of Commons Select Committee in May 2011, raising concern about large banks and trading houses owning facilities that store other people's metal.

The U.K.'s Office of Fair Trading dismissed concerns that ownership of warehouses gives certain market players an unfair advantage, saying on Tuesday that there were no "obvious competition issues that would merit further investigation at this stage."

Goldman's Detroit warehouse holds about 1.15 million tons out of a total 4.62 million tons in LME-approved warehouses.

Since Goldman bought Metro early last year, the wait time for aluminum delivery in Detroit has increased to about seven months.

Metro charges its customers 42 cents a day for storing one metric ton of aluminum in Detroit, which is about the industry average. At 900,000 tons in the warehouses, Goldman is earning $378,000 a day on rental costs, or about $79 million in seven months.

"Warehouses are making a lot more money," said Jorge Vazquez, managing director of aluminum at Harbor Commodity Research. Goldman is "really the winner clearly, because if you want to take metal away from the location, you have to wait up to 10 months to get your metal out, and in the meantime you're paying rent."
While the obvious purpose of "warehousing" is nothing short of artificially bottlenecking primary supply, these same warehouses have no problem with acquiring all the product created by primary producers in real time, and not releasing it into general circulation: once again, a tactic used by De Beers for decades to keep the price of diamonds artificially high. But unlike De Beers, Goldman also gets to charge rental fees once demand delivery instructions are sent out. The rent ends up being substantial due to the firm's unwillingness to release handily available product to the market in due course:
Metro, meantime, is taking in metal. Metro also offers cash incentives to producers like Rio Tinto Alcan to store their metal in Metro's sheds for contracted periods, sometimes as much as $150 a ton, according to traders.

Once the metal is in the warehouse, the producers sell ownership to this metal on the open market. The new owner can't collect his metal for seven months because of the bottleneck. For that period, the new owner is stuck paying rent to Metro.

"The system is set up like a funnel, so you can dump large amounts of metal in the front end and only get a little out at the back end," said David Wilson, director of metals research at Société Générale SA. "It enables a situation where the rules of the warehousing system are taken advantage of."
Another beneficiary of this monopoly behavior of course are the actual metal producers, which benefit from this illegal and conflicted "middleman" intervention:
Aside from warehouses, producers of the metal are benefiting, because they are able to charge more for their metal. Klaus Kleinfeld, chief executive of Alcoa Inc., said in an interview that supply-and-demand factors are leading prices higher.
Yet it is not even Goldman or JPM's fault: after all they are merely following the guidelines set up by the LME:
"You can't blame the warehouses," Mr. Kleinfeld said.

U.S. aluminum sheet maker Novelis sent a letter to the LME in May "expressing concerns" about the warehousing situation, a company spokesman said.

The complaints led the LME to commission an independent study into the issue last July. That study recommended a sliding scale be adopted, rather than the fixed minimum of 1,500 tons a day. That would result in larger warehouse complexes being required to release more metal.

It effectively doubles the minimum amount required to be relinquished by Metro each day. The ruling would go into effect in April. The LME board on Thursday, however, failed to reach a consensus on the recommendations.
While warehousing used to be a last resort market at inception, it has now become, courtesy of the economies of scale of the middlemen, the "go-to" market, which makes any normal market clearing impossible.
Because should true market clearing be allowed, the prices for everything from aluminum to copper would plunge immediately:
The situation is made more aggravating for metal consumers because supply has far outweighed demand for most of the last decade, and there is more than 4.5 million metric tons of surplus metal stored in LME's warehouse system.
Alas as pointed out previously, with the exchanges ultimately merely conforming to the bidding of their host ponzi scheme governments, which will happily allow even further consolidation of warehousing facilities by the trio in order to artificially boost inflation ever higher, the final product is a vicious loop in which everyone benefits...Everyone but the end consumer of course, who is faced with an anti-competitive system controlled by a handful of Fed-funded players. 

And with China unlikely to open up sales of its own warehouses (especially since Chinese vendors are now well-known to use physical copper in storage to write letters of credit against for speculative purposes) to the market, the system will persevere until such time as global inflationary powers are finally destroyed and there is a scramble to dump inventories. Like what happened in the fall of 2008. At that point just as the status quo drives prices higher, so the unwind will result in a massive undershoot of prices from fair values. Which in turn will allow those insatiable importers of commoditized product such as China to feel like your typical mortgage-free living American at a K-mart blue light special. But of course we don't have to worry about that, because the central planners will never allow the system to implode like it did in 2008. After all that would defeat the whole purpose of central planning... 

In the meantime, good luck to anyone who wishes to break the cartel's monopoly in the aluminum, copper or any other commodity.

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China Makes The Case for Silver (Guest Post)


I am on record calling the silver market a Hunt Brothers type of market a few days before the market crashed. Well, it has happened. After soaring to a peak of $49.79 per ounce on 26 April, the silver price crashed to a low of $33.01 on 18 May.

With silver trading at a notch below $35, the question is....where to now?

In my analysis of the platinum market I compared the platinum price after the Tohoku quake in March this year to the platinum price after the Kobe quake in 1995. I did the same with the silver price, and wow, see what emerged!


Sources: I-Net Bridge: Plexus Asset Management.

The silver price reverted to the levels prior to the Tohoku disaster and has since tracked the price movements of the Kobe disaster. It is most interesting to note that the silver price took off a few days after Japan’s twin disaster. Why? I ask myself.


Sources: I-Net Bridge: Plexus Asset Management.

The only argument I can come up with is that sudden demand caught the market seriously short. This sudden demand could have emanated from the crisis in the MENA region as the affluent people in those countries took refuge in silver as a store of value that they could move across borders.

In addition to that, investors probably took fright at the jump in energy prices as a result of the MENA situation and rushed into the silver market. I think the earthquake in Japan perhaps led to fears that silver scrap recovery could also be severely hampered as the annual scrap recovery is equivalent to 29% of annual mining production.

Sources: CPM; Silver Institute; Plexus Asset Management.

It seems to me that, as in the case of industrial metals, the outlook for silver is heavily dependent on China. China’s fabrication demand for silver amounted to 21% of world fabrication demand ex coins last year. The country’s fabrication demand over the past five years has grown in line with the GDP at a rate of 11% per year.

At a growth rate of 9% per year it means that China’s fabrication demand will swell by 88 million ounces from the current 163 million to 251 million ounces by 2015. Mining production over the past five years has grown by 4% per year. If I assume that the growth rate will be maintained, it means the country’s mining production will rise by 22 million ounces from 98 million ounces in 2010 to 120 million ounces by 2015. A net shortfall of 66 million ounces! Yes, that excludes scrap recovery and investment demand.

Sources: CPM; Silver Institute; Plexus Asset Management.


Sources: CPM; CFLP; Li & Fung: Plexus Asset Management.

China used to be a net exporter of silver in the past mainly due to sales from government stockpiles. The situation was reversed in 2007, though, and the country’s imports are currently around 11% of total world supply.

From my research a very interesting fact came to the fore. The CPM Group’s seasonality index for silver has a very close relationship with the seasonality of China’s CFLP manufacturing PMI! That explains the importance of China in the world silver market.

U.S. Manufacturing: V-shaped Recovery Before A New Growth Cycle? (Guest Post)


Although job openings in the U.S. manufacturing sector slipped slightly in April to 230,000 from 235,000 in March, they have remained above 200,000 for four straight months for the first time since the summer of 2008 (see chart, data here.)

From the recessionary lows of 100,000 through mid-2009, manufacturing job openings have more than doubled to levels not seen since the summer of 2009, two years ago. We can expect ongoing improvements in America's manufacturing sector, both in terms of output and employment, as it continues to remain at the forefront of the economy recovery

In another sign of a strong economic recovery in the manufacturing sector, the after-tax profits of U.S. manufacturing corporations reached a record-high $144.5 billion in the first quarter of 2011, according to data released today by the Census Bureau.

Adjusted for inflation, first quarter profits this year were 6.6% ahead of the previous quarter, and 28.7% ahead of a year earlier. Compared to the pre-recession level of $124.1 billion in the fourth quarter of 2007, manufacturing profits have increased by 16.2% and $20.4 billion.
Another chart (below) shows annual real manufacturing output per worker from 1947-2010 using data from the BEA for manufacturing output by industry and data from the BLS on manufacturing employment.

In 1950, the average U.S. manufacturing employee produced $19,600 (in 2010 dollars) of output, and by 1976 the amount of output per worker had doubled to $38,500. During that period manufacturing productivity was growing annually at 2.63%.
Output per worker doubled again to $75,000 by 1997 (21 years later), as productivity per worker increased to 3.23%. Manufacturing output per worker approximately doubled again to $149,000 by 2010, but it only took 13 years because worker productivity accelerated to 5.42% during this period.

This is an amazing story of huge increases in U.S. worker productivity in the manufacturing sector. In fact, the growth in manufacturing worker productivity more than doubled from 2.63% per year in the period between 1950 and mid-1970s to 5.42% annually between 1997 and 2010. Whereas it took 26 years for output per worker to double during the first period (1950-1976), it only took 13 years during the more recent period (1997-2010).

Manufacturing workers in America keep getting more and more productive, which then allows us to produce more and more output over time, with fewer and fewer workers. That's a great story about an American industry that is healthy, successful and thriving, and not an industry in decline.

By continually increasing worker productivity and productive efficiency, the American manufacturing sector has been hugely successful at achieving one of the most important economic outcomes of being able to "produce more with less." In the process, those efficiency and productivity gains have helped conserve scarce resources, including human resources, more effectively than almost any other industry, except maybe farming.

It's hard to overstate how much the efficiency gains achieved by U.S. manufacturing have contributed to the improvements in our standard of living by making manufactured goods more affordable over time. We should spend less time complaining about fewer workers in manufacturing, and more time celebrating the phenomenal gains in manufacturing worker productivity.

In 2009, the U.S. produced $2.33 trillion of manufacturing output including mining and utilities, according to data from the United Nations. The U.S. ranked #1 in the world for manufacturing, and produced 14% more output than second-ranked China ($2.04 trillion) and twice as much output as third-ranked Japan ($1.15 trillion).
What's most impressive is that the U.S. produced almost as much manufacturing output as the manufacturing sectors of Germany (#4), Italy (#5), France (#6), Russia (#7), U.K. (#8), Brazil (#9) and Canada (#10) combined ($2.44 trillion).

We are constantly hammered with bad news about the decline in the number of manufacturing jobs in the U.S., but we never hear the good news about why that is happening:

I think we can now safely say that the profitability of the U.S. manufacturing sector has made a complete and total V-shaped recovery from the effects of the U.S. recession and global slowdown, and is now well-prepared and situated for a new cycle of growth and expansion in output, sales, jobs, R&D, and capital investment.

The Second Dot Com Bubble Has Now Burst


It is hard to believe that the first dot com bubble, so vivid to most semi-veteran traders, occurred over a decade ago. What is even harder to believe is that courtesy of the record liquidity bubble created by the Central Planning mafia, 2011 has already seen not only the second dot com bubble, but as the table below demonstrates, its bursting. Of all the dot com 2.0 IPO to hit the market in the past 3 months, the average return is now down 20%, but that has not prevented an underwriting syndicate comprised of the TBTFs to make billions in underwriting fees. Luckily, the fervor that previously had gripped some of the more volatile precious metals, and since spilled over into new public issues, has popped. Incremental cash will now be nearly impossible to get. To all companies that managed to take advantage of momo traders who have a memory of 15 minutes or less, congratulations. To everyone else: get in line for QE3. Wink, wink Groupon.



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Treasury Yield Snapshot: After the Head Fake

by dshort.com

Quick take: Yesterday's pop in yields looks like it was a head fake. Today stocks plummeted and Treasuries rallied. The ten-year yield, which jumped 11 basis points yesterday, fell 13 today to close again below 3% at 2.98.

The behavior of Treasuries is an area of special interest in light of the Fed's second round of quantitative easing, which was formally announced on November 3rd. The first chart shows the percent change for a basket of eight Treasuries since November 4th.

The next chart shows the daily performance of several Treasuries and the Fed Funds Rate (FFR) since 2007.

The source for the yields is the Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates from the US Department of the Treasury and the New York Fed's website for the FFR.


Here's a closer look at the past year with the 30-year fixed mortgage added to the mix (excluding points).

Here's a comparison of the yield curve at three points in time: 1) the Fed's QE2 announcement, 2) the February interim high for the 7, 10, 20 and 30-year yields 3) and the latest curve.

The next chart shows the 2- and 10-year yields with the 2-10 spread highlighted in the background.

The final chart is an overlay of the CBOE Interest Rate 10-Year Treasury Note (TNX) and the S&P 500.


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Thursday, June 16, 2011

Major International Market Returns

by Bespoke Investment Group

Although US equities have been under near constant selling pressure since the beginning of May, they have been holding up relatively well compared to the rest of the world. The table to the right shows the change in major international benchmark indices on a YTD basis. In local currency terms, US stocks have outperformed every other G-7 country besides Germany as well as all four BRIC countries. 

These numbers are somewhat misleading, however, as they do not take into account the decline in the US Dollar so far this year. After adjusting for the dollar's slide, US equities lose a bit of their luster. While US stocks are still outperforming all of the BRIC countries, they are underperforming every other G7 country except Canada and the UK.




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