Monday, September 1, 2014

Growth

By John Mauldin

Correlation Is Not Causation
The Limits of Economic Models
The Source of Growth
The Real Driver of Growth
Labor Day, San Antonio, and Washington DC

“It's said that power corrupts, but actually it's more true that power attracts the corruptible. The sane are usually attracted by other things than power.”

– David Brin in The Postman

“For every good idea, ten thousand idiotic ones must first be posed, sifted, sniffed, tried, and discarded. A mind that's afraid to toy with the ridiculous will never come up with the brilliantly original."

– David Brin, Orbit interview

As I begin my 15th year of writing Thoughts from the Frontline – some 700-odd newsletters plus 400–500 editions of Outside the Box, 6 books, and scores of special reports – I decided to take a random walk back through some of my writings (and your comments!). With some glaring and notable exceptions that I would like to take off the internet (but won’t because to do so seems somewhat intellectually dishonest), the body of work has held together pretty well. My writing style has matured and so has my thought process – or at least it seems so to me. Writing this letter has been the best personal educational tool I have ever experienced, enriching my life far more than I have probably enriched yours. I’ve done my 10,000 hours. Plus. No college, no course or seminar, could provide me with the wide range of materials I’ve studied.

And that is the thing that stands out to me: the wide variety of topics we’ve covered over the years. The themes vary from week to week and month to month. I write about what interests me that week – where my research and curiosity are taking me. I am, of course, influenced by my somewhat heavy travel schedule and the interaction I have with readers from all over the world (some 65 countries now), both directly and through correspondence. I seem to attract a number of readers who are quite willing to push back and make me think about all sides of an issue. For that I’m grateful.

I want to thank each and every reader, many of whom have been there for all 15 years and some who just joined my assembly of best friends last week, for the precious gift of your attention. In a world where we are all assaulted with multiple competing cries for our immediate focus – family, friends, business, social commitments, political and community involvements, household chores, trying to stay fit – all while trying to keep up with the vast flow of information coming at us 24 hours a day from 100 different sources – I recognize that when I show up two or three times every week, I am asking for the most valuable thing you have: your time.

Each week when I sit down to write, I strive to be worthy of your time. I try to bring some insights that will deepen your understanding of how the world works, not always just in economics, but always with a focus on making us better investors and people.

This letter has always been free, and it is my intention to make sure it always is. My style is more casual than that of many other writers, but that’s because from the beginning I’ve always seen this letter as something I’m writing to my best friends. So write back. I do read your comments and appreciate your thoughtful insights and suggestions. That’s how best friends stay in touch.

Sometimes the best ideas for a letter come in response to questions and comments from readers. Last week I responded to a letter from sci-fi writer, professional contrarian, and my good friend David Brin. We took a journey into the world of Adam Smith. You can read that here.

This week I will respond to the second part of David’s letter. Please note that David and I characterize our conversations as joyous deliberations, excited parry and thrust in the realm of ideas. I especially appreciate David because he forces me to think about many of my casual assumptions, although in a battle of wits with David I often feel as if I’m bringing a knife to a gunfight. (Every writer needs a few David Brins in his life. Sometimes I think I have more than my share.) The part of the letter I’ll respond to today is as follows:

John, excellent [Outside the Box] missive on automation. I share your overall optimism.

Still... although Keynesianism deserves lots of criticism for the 30% of the time that it has proved wrong... and Hayek had a lot of good and important things to say... it remains disappointing that you do not use your influence to help hammer nails into the coffin of the Rentier Caste's catechism... Supply Side (Voodoo) Economics (SSVE), which is not just 30% wrong. It has proved to be almost 100% diametrically opposite to right, with every forecast that SSVE ever made having proved to be calamitously wrong.

David, I think there are more than a few problems with that paragraph. Since we don’t want to write a book here, let’s deal with just a few of them:

  1. You confuse correlation with causation.
  2. You make the common mistake made by many economists (which I’ve come to think of as the single biggest error in economics) in that your “model” simply does not take into account enough variables to enable you to draw the conclusions that you do. (I should note that here I am guilty of doing the same thing when I want to prove a point. It is an utterly human flaw, but one that politicians, philosophers, and economists have in abundance. There’s a 12-step program in here somewhere.)
  3. Further, I have no idea how you associate supply-side economics with what Adam Smith refers to as rentiers. Seriously, I know of no self-respecting supply-side or Austrian economist who favors crony capitalism. For that matter, I think it would be difficult to find a Keynesian who would admit to as much. Yet, in spite of no one’s being in favor of crony capitalism, somehow bureaucrats and politicians manage to create favored constituencies. Of course, each constituency rationalizes that the policies favoring it are necessary for the public good and are fair or whatever, but it seems that everyone wants their turn at the trough.
  4. Even were we to use the sophisticated analytic and predictive models based on multivariable dynamics that professional economists favor, we would still miss the core ingredients of growth.

Ultimately we are talking about economic growth, a topic you and I delve into frequently, and I want to spend the bulk of this letter on that topic.

Correlation Is Not Causation

Readers do not have the advantage of referring to our multiple previous discourses in which you argued that growth under Republican administrations and supply-side economics has been weaker than growth under Democratic and Keynesian policies. You have cool charts. I can also produce charts which show that, depending on how you choose your time frame (is the Clinton growth era a result of Gingrich-initiated policies?), supply-side economics and fiscal restraint were the drivers of growth in the ’90s. And you’re not going to get me to agree that the damaging surge in spending by the Republicans in 2000-2006 was reflective of supply-side economics. The tax cuts then produced more revenue, but a profligate Congress doubled down on spending and blew the benefits of the tax cuts.

But the reality is that there has been no pure, scientifically established experiment comparing differences in the application of various economic theories. We are in the field of conjecture here. As we will see in a moment, the key causes of growth in the last 100 years have lain entirely outside the fields of politics and economics, fiscal policy, and monetary policy. To conduct a rigorous economic experiment you would have to have multiple controlled environments where you could test your hypotheses. This is not possible in economics, and so we are subjected to endless rounds of speculation about cause and effect.

Politicians and monetary apologists are quick to take credit for positive economic developments and to blame negative developments on past bad decisions of the “other guys.” (Both sides do it. Bush had his “Clinton recession,” and Obama had his “Bush recession.” Reagan blamed the Carter years.) While fiscal and monetary policy are important, they are somewhere around numbers four and five on the list of the drivers of growth.

That being said, I readily acknowledge that bad economic policies can inhibit the sources of growth from being able to function. At the very least, good economic policy and good governance get out of the way of growth; and at best, they encourage and foster the drivers of growth.

The Limits of Dynamic Multivariate Economic Models

Along about the early part of the last century the economics profession developed a bad case of physics envy. It wanted to move from being a soft science to a hard science. At some point “we” (I use that term loosely) felt we were capable of creating mathematical models that would not only explain how economies worked but would also predict outcomes. There was a time, sadly not all that long ago, when I actually had the hubris to think such things were possible. Governments especially wanted these models, as they needed to be able to understand what the effects of their policies would be on the economy. And since everyone (except a few Luddites), no matter their political or economic persuasion, believed in the necessity of economic growth as a driver of improvement in the general good, we were all keenly interested in predicting what the outcomes of particular policies would be vis-à-vis growth.

Now, as I showed a few months ago, back at the very beginning of this new econometric world, politicians were looking for economic models that would allow them to pursue their desired political objectives. If your political objective was a small government footprint, you favored certain models which suggested that was the proper course of action. If your political objective was a larger government and income redistribution, you favored other types of models. The latter approach (Keynesianism) has won out so far.

The problem is that whichever model you choose – and they have become increasingly more sophisticated – they are all still lousy at predicting the future. They’re not even very good at analyzing the present or the past, because they are so fraught with errors implicit in the assumptions the modelers make. I should point out this is not just a problem with economic models; you can probably give me examples off the top of your head in the hard sciences, and the other soft sciences are riddled with such errors. Assumptions can be a bitch. (For new readers, that is a technical economics term.)

Still, I’m not against the use of models. I use them all the time. They are the best tools we have, and they are getting better. They give us insights into general trends and directions. If you understand the construction and the limits of CPI and GDP, for instance, then a model that utilizes those variables can be quite a useful tool. But if you view your input variables and accompanying assumptions as scripture, you’re likely going to make errors in judgment and policy. That is because you think something is true, in the sense of being black or white, when it is actually just a darker shade of pale. We see, said St. Paul, through a glass darkly. For economists, so far, the glass is really quite smoky. And held at certain angles, it distorts reality.

Something as complex as the economy of the United States, or even a relatively small system, cannot be adequately modeled, as there are just too many variables in play (many of them unknown). Further, economies are never in equilibrium, so even a multivariate dynamic-equilibrium model assumes a relatively static, and by definition closed, economy (though many economists would argue vehemently that that is not the case).

The real world is not so simple. It is the “surprises” in the system, the exogenous forces that impinge on your model, that always wreak havoc with your forecasts. And economics (econometricians’ protests notwithstanding), is still as much art as it is science. It is more philosophy than it is biology (or even psychology). We use models to try to show us where to put the pieces of the puzzle. Where we err is when we confuse the model for the puzzle.

For instance, one of the key assertions of John Keynes’s economic theory is the primacy of consumption and its impact on growth. And there is a certain truth to that, because without economic activity, without people buying things, there can be no growth. And thus Keynesians assert that in times of economic inactivity or a recession, governments should run deficits in order to spur consumption, to restart the engines of the economy … to recharge the “animal spirits.”

Others, in particular myself, think that income is far more important. Keynesian monetary policy, by lowering rates, encourages people to take on debt. But debt is future consumption brought forward, so all we are really doing is buying things today rather than in the future. Whereas if we create more income, we not only have more to spend today but we will also have more to spend in the future. And thus, David, supply-siders would argue that lowering taxes will drive economic growth as incomes grow.

Lowering taxes has the side benefit of increasing savings, which is the mother’s milk of investment and growth. Look at the following chart from Ned Davis. What it shows is that an increase in consumption (as measured by personal consumption expenditures) as a percentage of disposable personal income is not a necessary condition for growth. In fact, as the data in his tables shows, lower consumption percentages correlate strongly with higher growth. Yes, I know, correlation is not causation. But it does suggest an area for further investigation. And lower consumption also generally goes along with higher savings, which of course is the source for increased investment, which is the ultimate driver of growth.

Here are the same tables in a size you can probably read:

Quoting Ned Davis:

So what are some of the problems that continue to weigh on growth? Well, my usual suspects are debt and low savings and investment. But let’s look at them from different perspectives today. One of the things the U.S. government has tried to do to goose economic growth ever since 2000 was to stimulate consumption. And consumption has indeed been high relative to income, as featured on [the chart below]. But note that, in what must be a shock to most Keynesian economists, growth has historically done better when the levels of consumption were low – another way of saying savings were high.

The Source of Growth

Let’s talk first about some things you and I can agree on, and then about the sources of recent growth. The economy has been growing at roughly 2% since the end of the Great Recession, a very mediocre recovery to say the least. At least a third of that growth has come directly from the oil fracking boom, which is all about technology and nothing about government policy. Further, much of the ancillary growth in the economy has come from the availability of low-cost energy to manufacturing, encouraging large manufacturers to come back from all over the world to locate near what will be a long-term supply of plentiful, cheap natural gas. Witness the $750 million plant built by Nucor Steel on the Mississippi River in Louisiana, one of hundreds of plants scattered around the country near cheap sources of energy.

Quite frankly, about the only thing that has kept the United States from looking like Europe the past five years has been the remarkable innovation in the technology that allows us to extract oil and gas at reasonable prices (and, luckily, we also happen to have them in abundance).

But it is not just the fact that we have the technology and remarkable shale resources. Look at this slide sent to me by my friend Mark Yusko (one of 98 in his remarkable PowerPoint deck, which I sent on to my Over My Shoulder readers. While the US is indeed blessed, there are other parts of the world that have enormous potential as well.

Why has it happened here and not elsewhere? Because we have the other necessary ingredients for growth: the rule of law, private property (notice that none of the oil boom has occurred on US government property), access to capital markets, a relatively free market, and an innovative society. Look at that map and guess where the new winners will be. This of course does not show the conventional natural gas reserves of Russia or the Middle East. As you and I both probably believe, natural gas will be the transition energy source on our way to a solar society (or one based on some other, even cheaper and renewable energy source).

I am a huge fan of the energy boom and can’t resist just one more slide before we move on. It shows one of the regions in the Permian Basin (in West Texas, in what might otherwise be known as godforsaken country, although I risk offending my fellow Texans who live in Odessa and Midland, where George W. Bush ran his first political race and lost). What is remarkable is that this is a region from which you would think we had pulled, or at least explored and found, every last bit of oil and gas possible over the last 60 years. But that’s not the case. There are verified reports that an entirely new zone has been found in what is now projected to be the second largest oil field in the world (after the Ghawar field in Saudi Arabia). The discovery of “whales” in what was supposedly thoroughly explored territory are not supposed to happen, according to the Peak Oil theorists.

The fascinating thing is that there are five different vertical zones in this one field (and there are many fields with similar characteristics), all susceptible to horizontal drilling from one well location. This means one pad (where a drilling rig sits) can take the place of 40 or 50 conventional pads. Besides being more cost-efficient, this technology is certainly more environmentally friendly. They will be drilling 25 wells from what is basically one pad, extending the wells in all directions for over two miles. The old images of a forest of derricks and dust are from a bygone era. I assume they will use the same technology being developed here in the Bakken, too, where derricks are now moved a little ways to drill the next hole. (The Bakken itself is now assumed to have at least four recoverable vertical zones. The newly discovered Permian Basin zones in Texas make the Bakken look small.)

This brings up an ancillary issue that I will really have to do a whole letter about. Whatever growth there is in the US, the Federal Reserve is taking credit for; yet we are seeing Larry Summers and many others blaming something they call secular stagnation for the halting recovery. The problem with the punk growth is not their Keynesian uber-easy monetary policy – gods forbid you would think so – no, it’s the fault of the free market for not responding. So something must be broken in the market – our economic theory is still sound and working fine!

This is where we get what I think is the greatest confusion of causation and correlation in economics. Every economic recovery post-recession since World War II saw fiscal deficits and easier money. Economists then ascribe recovery to fiscal deficits and easier money .

Bullschmitt. (Another technical economics term for new readers.) What happened in every recovery was that businesses restructured, pure and simple. They figured out how to reduce costs, turn a profit again, and move forward. This is been the modus operandi of businesses since the Medes were trading with the Persians. Do lower rates help? Of course. Has increasing leverage in society also been a great source of growth? Absolutely. But as Rogoff and Reinhart’s work clearly shows, when you come to the end of that debt-fueled growth period, you have a financial crisis that sometimes takes two decades to work your way out of. Yes, we do have a structural problem, but it is the structure of our reigning economic theory that has brought it on. To the extent that there has been a recovery, it has been due to businesses restructuring on their own.

Our monetary policy has simply served to enrich those who were already rich, in the hope that somehow economic recovery would trickle down. We have forced savers to reach for yield and pushed them into ever more risky investments at precisely the time the Boomer generation should be retiring and looking for safe havens.

That does not mean we are doomed to a slow-growth decade if we take the proper steps to restructure things. Let me just say that the team that is at the helm today is so convinced of the correctness of its policies that the words restructure and change are simply not in their vocabulary.

And talk about assumptions in models! If you look at the forecast from the Congressional Budget Office for the next 10 years, you will notice that they assume there will be no recession. If there is even a mild recession, the federal deficit and debt blow out to gargantuan proportions, creating even more of a problem of “crowding out” than we have today.

Let’s conclude with a few thoughts from the report from the venerable Ned Davis, mentioned above:

Excess debt and low investment in particular have hurt productivity. In fact, there has been very little growth in non-financial productivity over the last year (or the last few years), as featured in the nearby chart [which I did not include]. And that lack of investment also probably means a halt to the improvement in the federal deficit.

In conclusion, monetary growth and low interest rates have worked to the extent that we are seeing half-full economic growth, which should continue. Yet, longer-term problems with debt, savings, and low investment weigh on growth potential.

That is the real problem with your Keynesian-fueled recovery. It is fueled too much by debt and not enough by productive income. We have borrowed from the future for decades, and now the future is here, and it’s payback time. And as we all know, payback is a bitch.

The Real Driver of Growth

But let’s not lose hope. Growth springs from more than property rights, the rule of law, competitive free markets, and a strong work ethic. Those are certainly the basic conditions necessary for the type of growth we have seen in the last 200 years. But the scientific revolution that started concurrently with the Industrial Revolution in the late 1700s has spurred an ever-increasing cycle of innovation.

This article from this week’s Economist frames the story:

Over the past few decades it has become clear that innovation – more than inputs of capital and labour – is what drives a modern economy. In the developed world, the application of technological know-how and scientific discoveries by companies, institutions and government establishments accounts for over half of all economic growth. Because of its seminal influence on wealth-creation in general and employment in particular, the manner in which innovation functions – especially, the way it comes and goes in Darwinian bursts of activity – has emerged as a vital branch of scholarship.

What researchers have learned is that waves of industrial activity, first identified by the Russian economist Nikolai Kondratieff in 1925, have a character all of their own. Typically, a long upswing in a cycle starts when a new set of technologies begins to emerge – eg, steam, rail and steel in the mid-19th century; electricity, chemicals and the internal-combustion engine in the early 20th century. This upsurge in innovation stimulates investment and invigorates the economy, as successful participants enjoy fat profits, set standards, kill off weaker rivals and establish themselves as the dominant suppliers.

Over the years, the boom peters out, as the technologies mature and returns to investors slide. After a period of slower growth comes the inevitable decline. This is followed eventually by a wave of fresh innovation, which destroys the old way of doing things and creates conditions for a fresh upswing – a process Joseph Schumpeter, an Austrian economist, labelled “creative destruction”.

Back in the late 1990s, Babbage noticed that the waves of innovation had begun to speed up (see “Catch the wave”, February 18th 1999). The industrial waves Kondratieff observed in the 1920s came every 50-60 years or so. By the late 1990s, fresh ones were arriving twice as often. Fifteen years on, their frequency appears to have doubled yet again. Waves of new innovations now seem to be rolling in every 10 to 15 years.

I think those waves are going to come at us even faster in the next 20 years, resulting in what I call the Age of Transformation. Literally, our lives will be transformed, and at an ever-increasing pace of change. The Gartner Group has developed a cool paradigm that they call the “hype cycle.” They basically see every technology through the lens of five different phases in this hype cycle: the innovation trigger, the peak of inflated expectations, the trough of disillusionment, the slope of enlightenment, and the plateau of productivity.

For the past 20 years, Gartner has produced an annual update of various hype cycles that provide snapshots of the progress certain technologies have made during the previous year, where on the innovation cycle they currently reside, and how long they will take to reach maturity (if ever). This year’s collection (published on August 11) assesses the prospects of some 2,000 technologies, grouped into 119 aggregated areas of interest.

The chart below is the most recent hype cycle, published by the Gartner Group last month. See if you can find a few new technologies that you didn’t know even existed.

It would be nice if we could just sit back and let growth happen. But as it turns out, our government seems to be doing its best to retard growth. The bureaucracy of government has become what Newt Gingrich calls “the prison guards of the past.”

In field after field, regulators feel the necessity to control the spread of technology in ways that are consistent with the past they seem to want to perpetuate. Neither Newt nor I is against reasonable regulation (it is a requirement for civilization); but regulation run amok kills growth and jobs, and in the case of one federal regulatory body it is killing people. (Warning: this hits one of my personal hot buttons.)

This week I was confronted with a single FDA bureaucrat slowing down a new medical technology by what may be five months. Doesn’t sound like much time, does it? Except that this is a technology that will literally save millions of lives per year. Not improve life, understand: save lives. As in life or death. (Given the provision that the technology must be proven to work as we expect it to.) Rather than focusing on what we can do to move this crucial innovation along as fast as possible, the regulator is forcing this company to spoon feed him information that has already been provided in multiple forms. Because he evidently didn’t have the time to read the massive amounts of information provided, he simply came up with a bogus reason to excuse his inaction and delay further progress. The fact that the lives of fathers and mothers and daughters and sons and spouses and friends will be lost evidently doesn’t bother him.

I wish I could say it was just this one instance, but we all know that this sort of thing happens many dozens of times a year. The entire process of drug approval is broken. It is rigged to benefit Big Pharma and largely prevents small startups from succeeding by dramatically increasing costs beyond what is necessary.

If I could wave a magic wand and change just one thing in our government, it would be to replace the FDA. Not reform it – I don’t want to tinker at the margins. We need an FDA for the 21st century. I’m not advocating some wild west scenario, either – of course we need a regulatory process for the medical field, but not one that is killing what should be the leading new technology in the United States, not to mention delaying lifesaving and life-enhancing technologies that are so needed. The majority of biotechnological research is done in the US; but under the current regulatory regime, it is increasingly likely that the early benefits will not be enjoyed by us, and that jobs that should be created here will be shipped offshore.

Energy should not be the leading job producer in the US; that should be new health and wellness technologies. I am watching some of the most promising new technology companies involved in extending life and healing bodies go shopping for venues outside of the US because the regulatory process is so onerous and time-consuming that the scientists literally don’t feel they can wade through it and don’t want to wait.

By the time they can get a process or drug approved, they are already three iterations beyond the original process for which their applications were filed. The field is literally moving that fast. We are going to be shipping jobs – high-paying, rewarding jobs – overseas, along with the new technologies. Dear gods, Japan and other forward-thinking countries are way ahead of us in the regulatory process. This is just wrong on so many levels.

Much of the US regulatory process is actually a fence-building program to protect the current workers or companies in a field. To use a rather odd example, why do some states feel that a nail technician needs to have a license that requires a 750-hour training program (at considerable cost) to learn something that every teenage girl knows how to do by the time she is 13 or 14? Seriously, do you need 750 hours of training (that you have to pay for) in order to be able to do a manicure for which you get paid 20 or 30 dollars?

As I probably don’t have many manicurists among my readers, I have hopefully not offended too many of you. But what if I started talking about your profession? Just saying. Many regulatory regimes are simply barriers to entry for new competition. Current participants basically capture the bureaucracy they deal with in order to ensure their own positions.

The desire to protect your own personal marketplace is not new. The concept started with guilds in the Middle Ages, and I assume some research would date it back to the time of the Medes and Persians. In the same way, many of us are beginning to feel uncomfortable with the increasing level of armaments in our local police and federal agencies. It seems that every government organization wants to extend its personal level of power and immunity. Can someone please tell me why the Railroad Retirement Board needs its own SWAT team? The Consumer Product Safety Commission? The US Department of Education? Seriously? Literally scores of agencies at the federal and state level seem to feel the need for SWAT teams. Many with armored vehicles. And then they find reasons to use them.

The principle of self-protection and self-aggrandizement holds in almost every area of bureaucratic regulation. In the same way that we all want and need the police in our neighborhoods, we do need regulators (or at least some of them). But an unchecked police force and a stultified regulatory bureaucracy can become a detriment to the society they are supposed to protect. In theory, that is why we subject these organizations to civilian control. In practice, it’s not happening. (End of rant.)

The original point I was trying to make is that the main driver of growth is not monetary policy, notwithstanding the current fetish for dissecting every utterance of the Federal Reserve. More important is US fiscal policy. Even more important is US regulatory policy. I think we have to mention our educational system (which is showing signs of being increasingly broken and inadequate for the 21st century) somewhere around here. But it’s crucial that the natural innovative drive that is inherent not just in US entrepreneurs but everywhere in the world is nurtured and encouraged.

That is not to say that monetary policy is not important. Get it wrong and we all lose. We all become poorer for the impediments to growth misguided monetary policy can create. Burdening a country with too much debt and crowding out productive investments in the process is likewise destructive.

Economists sometimes place too much emphasis on monetary and fiscal policy and miss the importance – in my opinion, the primary importance – of the other factors in the equation. That is somewhat to be expected because monetary and fiscal policy are what they study. But we need to keep things in perspective.

David, I’m sure you will have a few withering insights, and I look forward to reading and chewing them over with you. As always, I treasure our time together and our conversations.

Labor Day, San Antonio, and Washington DC

I’m enjoying my extended time at home here in Dallas. I had the pleasure of hosting Stephen Moore (you know him from the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal) the other evening, when we talked politics and economics into the late hours, over steaks at Nick & Sam’s. Stephen started the Club for Growth back in 1999 and has been an intellectual driver and personal force in pushing for policies that help create growth.

I’m looking forward to going to the Casey Research Summit in San Antonio in a few weeks. Quite a few of the usual (and unusual) suspects, many of them good friends, will be on hand, including James Rickards, Grant Williams, Mark Yusko, Lacy Hunt, Leland Miller from the China Beige Book, David Tice, Mike Shedlock, Rick Rule, and Alex Daly, as well as Stephen Moore. It is really quite the lineup, and for those of you interested in energy and natural resources, it is a must-not-miss conference. You can find out more here. The San Antonio Hill Country is beautiful this time of year, and the conference is at a splendid Hyatt resort well away from the city. I liked the Riverwalk, but this is better.

Then a few weeks later I will be in Washington DC for a private speaking event as well as meetings, and then head back home to celebrate my 65th birthday. Haven’t quite figured out what to do this year. Somehow 65 doesn’t seem nearly as important as 60 did.

Family and friends will gather Monday evening, and we’ll be grilling out by the pool of the apartment, celebrating my oldest son, Henry’s, 31st birthday. He has informed me that there is a new grandchild coming along.

Workouts are proceeding apace, although the weight is coming off more slowly than I would like. Everyone keeps telling me that muscle weighs more than fat, but Dr. Mike Roizen tells me I can only gain about a pound a week of muscle at the max. Oh well, you just have to keep plugging. Have a great week!

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Japan moves from Paul Krugman's liquidity trap to Haruhiko Kuroda's "indefinite QE" trap

by Sober Look

Japan's 10-year government bond yield is hovering around 0.5%, an all-time low.

Clearly this is the result of the Bank of Japan's unprecedented securities purchases via the ongoing quantitative easing (QE) program that was accelerated last year.

BoJ's holdings of Japanese government securities (source BOJ)

While a number of economists such as Paul Krugman fully support this effort as a way of exiting the so-called "liquidity trap", the central bank's purchases are eroding the JGB market.

The Economist: - The BoJ is buying ¥7 trillion ($67 billion) of JGBs a month. It now owns a fifth of the government’s outstanding debt. Trading volumes have fallen dramatically, as has volatility in prices. One day in April there was no trading at all in the most recent issue of the benchmark ten-year bond.
Last year's QE acceleration has begun to take more securities out of the private market than is being issued by the government.

Source: Deutsche Bank

The Bank of Japan was hoping that as yields decline, the banking system will begin replacing JGBs it holds with loans to the private sector, thus stimulating growth and releasing more bonds into the market. But banks have been slow to get out of JGBs.

The Economist: - Part of the reason that bond prices remain high is that financial institutions have not sold as many JGBs as the BoJ had hoped. It had assumed that falling yields would prompt banks to shift their holdings into riskier assets, stimulating the economy. Although Japan’s biggest banks sold JGBs in the months immediately following the BoJ’s first purchases in 2013, they have now largely stopped. Regional banks, the most notorious JGB-addicts, hung on to their bonds, and are now purchasing more.
With rates on private sector loans now also at historical lows (around 0.8%–0.9% according to DB) and the overall private inventory of government paper declining, JGBs remain attractive on a relative basis, even at current rates. In fact, measured in terms of returns on regulatory capital, private sector lending looks terrible. Just as the case in the Eurozone, holding government paper is quite rational for banks.
Moreover, markets are pricing in an ongoing QE effort for the foreseeable future, which will end up taking even more paper out of private hands.
Deutsche Bank: - ... note that implied volatility in the JGB futures market is now abnormally low, which would appear to reflect a general expectation that the BOJ will persist with its massive bond-buying operations indefinitely. Put simply, very few market participants currently believe that the central bank is capable of achieving its +2% "price stability target", and therefore assume that it will remain in easing mode for the foreseeable future.
Exiting this program in a market that has become increasingly dysfunctional will be more difficult and disruptive with time. And given the government's unparalleled debt problem, is exit from QE even possible without nudging the "unsustainable equilibrium" (vicious circle of rising rates and rising debt burden)?

Japan has moved from Paul Krugman's liquidity trap to Haruhiko Kuroda's "indefinite QE" trap.

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Double Whammy China PMI Misses Spark Sell-Side Demands For More Stimulus

by Tyler Durden

A record-breaking surge in monthly credit creation and a trillion Yuan of QE-lite was enough to provide a glimmer of hope into the tumbling Chinese economy for one or maybe two months but with the real estate market continuing to free-fall, it should be no surprise that China's PMIs finally catch down to the erstwhile reality simmering under the surface in the ultimate centrally-planned economy. China's official government PMI dropped from 30-month highs, missed expectations and the early month flash print, to less exuberant 51.1 reading (with Steel industry new orders totally collapsing) with both medium- and small-companies printing contractionary sub-50 levels. Then (after Japan's PMI beat - of course it did as hard data crashes worst on record), HSBC China PMI also missed, printing a slightly expansionary 50.2 Showing, as BofA warns "the two PMIs both show that the current recovery is relatively weak and choppy..." and RBS adds "we expect the government to interpret such an outlook as challenging its growth target and to take more, and more significant, measures to support growth."

As Goldman writes,

August official PMI tends to be biased on the upside. Since the data started in 2005, this is the second time it fell in August (first time was August 2012). The degree of seasonality probably has been reduced in recent years but may still exist. This suggests underlying slowdown might be more meaningful, which is consistent with the weak reading of the HSBC PMI.

Almost all components showed signs of cyclical slowdown, which indicates the evidence of an incremental slowdown is conclusive. Among them the new orders and production sub-indexes are particularly important because unlike the headline readings they do not lag mom IP and have a closer fit with mom IP readings. Both fell meaningfully in August. In terms of drivers of weaker orders, export orders fell less than overall orders but the difference was not large.

We believe this weakening reflects less supportive policy stance since July and possibly less supportive underlying exports growth. Gradual deceleration from strong sequential growth in June is consistent with our forecasts, though there is risk of a steeper deceleration if policy and monetary/credit conditions don't ease meaningfully from the July stance. We are still on track to reach the 7.3% GDP forecast for 3Q and the whole year though the risks are largely balanced instead of clearly tilted towards the upside.

Small- and Medium-Sized companies are both in contraction...

*  *  *

This catastrophic miss by 0.1 points immediately saw Markit's economist proclaim more stimulus was needed and BofA's China-watchers calling for a fresh round of stimulus... or else...

China's NBS manufacturing PMI slowed to 51.1 in August from 51.7 in July. The reading is slightly below the consensus forecast at 51.2, and is in line with the drop of the HSBC flash PMI to 50.3 in August from 51.7 in July. The main drags leading to the decline were output and new orders which fell to 53.2 and 52.5 in August from 54.2 and 52.5 in July respectively. Today's reading confirmed the weakness of the economy and the softening momentum. But since the new leadership is determined to deliver stable growth during their period of power consolidation, especially in the run up to the 4th Plenum in October, we believe Beijing will step up its mini-stimulus in coming weeks. We maintain our 7.4% growth forecast for both 3Q and 4Q.

Why did growth slow down again?
As we explained in our 2H preview, there are three types of headwinds in 2H: the high base effect, the anti-corruption campaign and the downturn in the property sector. The anti-corruption campaign, though definitely positive for growth in the long-term, has hit the economy in the short term. The campaign also made the central government's stimulus effort less effective as local government officials are not incentivized to speed up fiscal spending and investment projects. 

A fresh round of stimulus
The Chinese government last week announced a fresh round of mini-stimulus to counter the downward pressure on growth. These measures include an RMB20bn PBoC relending with preferential rate to the agriculture sector, a push for ramping up investment in clean energy and public facilities such as hospitals, nursing homes and fitness centers, and a promise for delivering the target on social housing and more spending on environmental protection.

China’s third-quarter growth tends to be slower, and the level of lending in August will be “very critical” for the economy, Liu said.

“We expect the government to interpret such an outlook as challenging its growth target and to take more, and more significant, measures to support growth,” Louis Kuijs, Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc’s chief Greater China economist in Hong Kong, said in a note today.

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As a gentle reminder, nothing about China's credit crisis has improved from a year ago... in fact it's only got worse and more fragile as now, asset prices are falling too.

See the original article >>

Weighing the Week Ahead: Will Job Growth Sustain the Rally?

by oldprof

With the official end to summer, there are many topics for sunburned vacationers to consider as they settle in to their desks and boardrooms on Tuesday. Economic data has been mixed, but with a positive tilt. We learned the latest ideas from central bankers. There are assorted crises around the world. Somehow, in spite of it all, stocks showed a strong gain for August.

I expect the main topic from this will be the economic focus and Fed reaction. I expect financial media to be asking: What does the job picture mean – for the economy, financial markets, and the Fed?

Prior Theme Recap

In my last WTWA I expected that the news would focus on central bankers unwinding. That was indeed the dominant story, in spite of competing world events, but we got precious little new information. There will be some carry over from this theme in the week ahead.

Naturally we would all like to know the direction of the market in advance. Good luck with that! Second best is planning what to look for and how to react. That is the purpose of considering possible themes for the week ahead.

San Francisco Appearance

I enjoyed meeting some readers and making new friends during last week’s San Francisco Money Show. As I warned before the trip, there was too much going on for me to write my regular weekly update. My stay ended with a wee-hours wake-up from the earthquake. You can really feel the effects when on the 17th floor of a hotel! Locals were joking the next morning, perhaps because the injuries and damage were mild given the size of the quake (biggest since 1987).

I plan to lay out some of the themes from my presentation in future posts, but it has been hectic catching up after the trip. More on that to come.

This Week’s Theme

In the holiday-shortened week ahead we have an avalanche of economic data and crises from around the world. Many different topics could command attention. Out of these choices, I expect special attention on employment data – more so than ever. Why?

The Jackson Hole Fed Symposium highlighted the continuing importance of the employment situation. Here are the key questions about economic growth:

Are the job gains enough to sustain (or improve?) the rate of economic growth? Looking beyond the gross numbers, is there enough improvement in full-time jobs? Is the quality of employment adequate?

Even if that hurdle is surmounted, there is the question of labor market slack. How much room is there to stimulate job creation without sparking inflation?

Fed Chair Yellen believes that better employment prospects will improve labor force participation, keeping wage pressures low. This is a “cyclical” view of the labor force participation decline. Only after the participation rate improves, will there be a need to consider emphasizing the Fed’s inflation goal rather than employment.

The alternative viewpoint, laid out thoroughly in this week’s Barron’s Cover story, Work’s for Squares, emphasizes structural causes. The argument focuses on those of prime working age, where the high post-WWII rates have been followed both by periods of decline and stability.

ON-BF883_CovLos_G_20140829223008

While there are many possible causes, one intriguing factor is the growth in disability. The causes are not the old-fashioned work injuries; in fact, the workplace is safer. Someone on disability does not get much income, but does (after a wait) receive Medicare. This is a financial disincentive for returning to work.

ON-BF882_CovDis_G_20140829222938

The article provides a good summary of data from various sources.

As usual, I have a few thoughts to help in sorting through these conflicting viewpoints. First, let us do our regular update of the last week’s news and data. Readers, especially those new to this series, will benefit from reading the background information.

Last Week’s Data

Each week I break down events into good and bad. Often there is “ugly” and on rare occasion something really good. My working definition of “good” has two components:

  1. The news is market-friendly. Our personal policy preferences are not relevant for this test. And especially – no politics.
  2. It is better than expectations.

The Good

There was some important good news.

  • Q3 Growth on Track for 3%. The Atlanta Fed’s Macroblog provides evidence for this early and tentative conclusion.
  • Durable goods orders showed record growth. Scott Grannis understands that it was mostly about aircraft. He suggests that it shows strong confidence in travel. See his charts and analysis.
  • Consumer confidence hit a new high. Doug Short has the story on the Conference Board version, the Michigan version, and historical context for both. Ed Yardeni highlights the importance for the economy. Here is a key chart:

dshort consumer confidence

us-nonresidential-fixed-investment-quarterly-annualized-rate-us-nonresidential-fixed-investment-quarterly-annualized-rate_chartbuilder-3

The Bad

There was also some negative news.

  • Durable goods orders ex-transportation disappointed. Looking beyond the headline surge, many analysts immediately noted that aircraft orders were the whole story. Doug Short has a more comprehensive analysis, adjusting both for population and inflation in considering the long-term trend.
  • The Russian Economy is in Trouble. The Forbes story from Kenneth Rapoza lays out the problems. I am scoring this as “bad” because of the effects on the European economy. It is, of course, the intended result of the sanctions.
  • Bullish sentiment has spiked again — a contrarian indicator. Bespoke has the full analysis including this chart:

aaiibullbear

  • Personal income and spending missed expectations. This is a blow to hopes for better economic growth. Steven Hansen explores this angle while looking at some history.
  • New home sales declined. Calculated Risk notes that the data were OK if the revisions to prior months are included. (Analysis and charts here).

The Ugly

Our “ugly” list for the last few weeks remains unfortunately accurate. We had headline news from all conflicts with plenty of violence and death competing for our attention. The Ebola crisis, cited a few weeks ago, continues to worsen.

The Silver Bullet

I occasionally give the Silver Bullet award to someone who takes up an unpopular or thankless cause, doing the real work to demonstrate the facts.  Think of The Lone Ranger. No award this week. Nominations are welcome.

Quant Corner

Whether a trader or an investor, you need to understand risk. I monitor many quantitative reports and highlight the best methods in this weekly update. For more information on each source, check here.

Recent Expert Commentary on Recession Odds and Market Trends

Doug Short: An update of the regular ECRI analysis with a good history, commentary, detailed analysis and charts. If you are still listening to the ECRI (almost three years after their recession call), you should be reading this carefully. Doug includes the most recent ECRI discussion, which has been consistently bearish, despite the blown call on the recession.

Bob Dieli does a monthly update (subscription required) after the employment report and also a monthly overview analysis. He follows many concurrent indicators to supplement our featured “C Score.”

RecessionAlert: A variety of strong quantitative indicators for both economic and market analysis. Dwaine’s “liquidity crunch” signal played out as projected. This week he highlights his HILO Breadth index which he has designed to pinpoint bottoms and to warn of protracted corrections. Current readings imply an opportunity that usually shows up only once a year. Check out the full post for a description and charts.

Georg Vrba: Updates his unemployment rate recession indicator, confirming that there is no recession signal. Georg’s BCI index also shows no recession in sight. For those interested in hedging their large-cap exposure, Georg has unveiled a new system. Georg now has another new program, with ideas for minimum volatility stocks for tax-efficient returns. He also has new advice for those seeking a safe withdrawal rate, now featuring the use of put options to protect against extreme events.

The Week Ahead

We have a big week for economic data and events.

The “A List” includes the following:

  • Employment situation report (F). The most widely followed, despite the many angles and adjustments.
  • ISM Index (T). Good concurrent gauge of activity and employment in manufacturing.
  • Beige book (W). Anecdotal reports that will provide background color at the next Fed meeting.
  • Initial jobless claims (Th). The best concurrent news on employment trends.

The “B List” includes the following:

  • ISM Services (Th). A shorter series than the manufacturing version, but a bigger slice of the economy.
  • Auto sales (W). Truck sales reflect small business and construction.
  • ADP employment (Th). A good independent read on net job growth.
  • Trade balance (Th). Important element of GDP calculation.
  • Construction spending (T). July data.
  • Factory orders (W). July data, but an important economic sector.

Fed participants are back on the speaking circuit. Did you miss them?

Breaking news from Ukraine is also likely, but nearly impossible to handicap on a short-term basis.

How to Use the Weekly Data Updates

In the WTWA series I try to share what I am thinking as I prepare for the coming week. I write each post as if I were speaking directly to one of my clients. Each client is different, so I have five different programs ranging from very conservative bond ladders to very aggressive trading programs. It is not a “one size fits all” approach.

To get the maximum benefit from my updates you need to have a self-assessment of your objectives. Are you most interested in preserving wealth? Or like most of us, do you still need to create wealth? How much risk is right for your temperament and circumstances?

My weekly insights often suggest a different course of action depending upon your objectives and time frames. They also accurately describe what I am doing in the programs I manage.

Insight for Traders

Felix switched to bullish last week and remains so. This had little effect on our trading accounts since nearly everything is in the penalty box. Uncertainty remains high – typical for a trading range market. Inverse ETFs were highly rated during this cycle but remained in the penalty box. This mean that Felix went to cash for a bit and also held bonds, but did not go short. The broad market ETFs are once again positive.

I frequently hear from young people looking for a trading job. Brett Steenbarger — PhD psychologist, author, trading coach, hedge fund consultant – is a great source for traders on all topics. His advice for those seeking trading jobs is first-rate: It is more than passion and desire! He provides some specifics on what to do and what to avoid, including how to build your credentials.

You can sign up for Felix’s weekly ratings updates via email to etf at newarc dot com.

Insight for Investors

I review the themes here each week and refresh when needed. For investors, as we would expect, the key ideas may stay on the list longer than the updates for traders. The current “actionable investment advice” is summarized here. In addition, be sure to read this week’s final thought.

We continue to use market volatility to pick up stocks on our shopping list. We do this because we also sell positions when they reach our (constantly updated) price targets. Being a long-term investor is not the same as “buy and hold.”

Here is our collection of great advice for this week:

The real “smart money” is looking past the obvious worries. The headlines and financial TV emphasize the scary stuff for the obvious reasons. Blackstone Advisor Byron Wein reports on a series of lunches he hosted, something he does every year. This is a good item to bookmark and review later as an example of how experienced investors use the “wall of worry.”

Many of the participants are well known and a number are billionaires. There are hedge fund managers, corporate leaders, activists, buyout specialists, real estate titans, private equity folk and venture capitalists, providing some diversity in terms of their daily activity. I am adding newcomers to lower the average age. The group was correctly positive during the past two summer sessions, so I was curious to see if their mood had changed with so much unrest around the world.

The answer is that the investors almost universally believed that all of the threatening geopolitical problems would somehow work themselves out favorably without significantly disturbing the United States economy or its financial markets.

“Google never forgets” writes Barry Ritholtz. The subject was CNBC’s feature of David Tice making (yet another) crash prediction. Barry notes his past history of such calls and the performance of his Prudent Bear fund.

I was delighted to get an email from a reader on this same theme. He pointed out the CNBC/Yahoo story citing two “experts” who were predicting a 60% crash. He did his research on both Tice and Abigail Doolittle discovering their past records. This reader is a former scientist who is amazed that the financial world does not provide accountability for cited sources. In the absence of a dramatic change in media behavior, only constant reminders will help people understand “that we are essentially just viewing or reading a more dangerous version of the National Enquirer.”

Google never forgets, but it should not be the responsibility of each reader to check every source.

Vitaliy Katsenelson has a good tale on an important subject for investors — confirmation bias. He explains how to make the best use of sources where you disagree with the conclusions.

My own worries. While on the subject of evidence and disconfirmation, I made a list of things that I was watching and what evidence would lead to less optimism about equities. I published it here as the Final Thought, and I keep it in mind.

If you are worried about possible market declines, you have plenty of company. This is one of the problems where we can help. It is possible to get reasonable returns while controlling risk. You can get our report package with a simple email request to main at newarc dot com. Also check out our recent recommendations in our new investor resource page — a starting point for the long-term investor.  (Comments and suggestions welcome.  I am trying to be helpful and I love and use feedback).

Final Thought

Is the decline in labor force participation structural or cyclical? I certainly cannot answer that question in the context of our weekly focus post, but I can suggest how to think about the problem.

  • Nothing in the Barron’s article would be a surprise to the Fed’s economists. They have looked at the data and reached a different conclusion.
  • There is a little truth in both arguments. Some who lost jobs have simply retired early. Others are restricted by underwater mortgages. Those who have taken temporary jobs or gone to school will react to a better job market.
  • This means that we should see at least some rebound in participation before wages really take off. As is the case with most economic arguments, changes do not come from flipping a light switch.

There is another important implication of this debate – one that we will see repeated for the next two or three years. Many have argued that the lack of any wage growth is a sign of a weak recovery and poor prospects for future consumption. If this finally starts to change, you can expect many of these same sources to warn about looming price increases.

It is more reasonable to expect an intervening period of improved economic growth and better wages. The Fed may eventually be too slow in changing course, but we’ll still be raising that question in a year or two.

See the original article >>

China’s Productivity Problem Drags on Growth

By Mark Magnier

    An employee works at a production line inside a Geely factory in Ningbo, Zhejiang province.
    Reuters

    China’s productivity is slipping away, the miracle days are largely over and the best way for Beijing to slow its slide into “the middle-income trap” is through meaningful structural reform, two reports argue, a process that has so far remained largely in the slow lane.

    China’s economy, once described as miraculous, is now struggling with rapid wage increases and a declining number of new workers, so productivity gains increasingly must come from structural reform, automation, greater company efficiency and innovation, the reports say.

    “China is now at this critical juncture, and maybe has been for several years,” writes Harry X. Wu, a senior advisor to The Conference Board’s China Center and an economics professor at Japan’s Hitotsubashi University. “This explains the ongoing ‘soft fall’ slowdown in economic growth despite the government’s continued stimulus exercises and continuing high-levels of investment and supporting credit expansion.”

    Mr. Wu argues in a Conference Board paper that China’s economic ascent may have been less miraculous than it appeared, with total factor productivity – a measure of an economy’s technological dynamism – badly lagging other Asian high-growth economies at a similar stage in their development.

    China’s 1% average annual growth in total factor productivity between 1978 and 2012 – a period when average per capita annual incomes rose from $2,000 to $8,000 — compares with 4% annual gains for Japan during its comparable 1950-1970 high-growth period, 3% for Taiwan from 1966-1990 and 2% for South Korea from 1966-1990, he said, when purchasing power in the relative economies is taken into account.

    “Our study shows that China’s spectacular growth in the reform period has been mainly investment-driven and quite inefficient,” Mr. Wu wrote.

    A big problem, which often complicates efforts to assess the health of China’s economy, is the reliability of Chinese data. Using three measures of productivity, J.P. Morgan economist Haibin Zhu concludes in a research note that China’s total factor productivity grew 1.1% in 2013 from a 3.2% expansion in 2008. Mr. Wu draws on different methodology to argue that total factor productivity turned negative from 2007 to 2012.

    “Correctly measuring China’s productivity has, not surprisingly, been obstructed by severe data problems that have resulted in widely contradictory productivity performance estimates,” Mr. Wu said.

    Echoing Mr. Wu’s view that investment rather than labor has in recent years driven China’s productivity – and not that well – Mr. Zhu said that China has made some of the right noises about much-needed structural reform, but finds implementation challenging.

    “Restoring productivity is critical,” for China if it wants to work down overcapacity while maintaining a relatively high growth rate, Mr. Zhu wrote. But when it comes to structural reform, “the current government has limited experience and is facing resistance from vested interest groups,” he added.

    Mr. Wu argues that China has a highly checkered history on productivity growth from 1957 until now – he describes the early 1957-1965 central planning days as a productivity “graveyard” – with the only major bright spot occurring between China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 and the global financial crisis in 2007. This period played to China’s competitive strength in labor-intensive industries as global markets expanded, he said.

    By 2006, however, China’s economy was already starting to overheat, fueled by Olympics-related over-investment, Mr. Wu argues, compounded by the massive stimulus program starting in 2008 that fueled inefficient investment and bad loans.

    Many countries that once seemed like miracle economies have not managed to increase their productivity, undergo fundamental restructuring and otherwise emerge from the so-called middle-income trap, including Argentina and Chile, Mr. Wu said in an interview.

    “The over-building, the over-capacity and the ‘advance’ of the less efficient State into private sector markets are now substantially dragging on China’s growth,” Mr. Wu wrote. “In short, the findings illuminate that China’s principle economic problem today is one of productivity.”

    See the original article >>

    Sunday, August 31, 2014

    Abenomics, European Style

    by Nouriel Roubini

    NEW YORK – Two years ago, Shinzo Abe’s election as Japan’s prime minister led to the advent of “Abenomics,” a three-part plan to rescue the economy from a treadmill of stagnation and deflation. Abenomics’ three components – or “arrows” – comprise massive monetary stimulus in the form of quantitative and qualitative easing (QQE), including more credit for the private sector; a short-term fiscal stimulus, followed by consolidation to reduce deficits and make public debt sustainable; and structural reforms to strengthen the supply side and potential growth.

    It now appears – based on European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s recent Jackson Hole speech – that the ECB has a similar plan in store for the eurozone. The first element of “Draghinomics” is an acceleration of the structural reforms needed to boost the eurozone’s potential output growth. Progress on such vital reforms has been disappointing, with more effort made in some countries (Spain and Ireland, for example) and less in others (Italy and France, to cite just two).

    But Draghi now recognizes that the eurozone’s slow, uneven, and anemic recovery reflects not only structural problems, but also cyclical factors that depend more on aggregate demand than on aggregate supply constraints. Thus, measures to increase demand are also necessary.

    Here, then, is Draghinomics’ second arrow: to reduce the drag on growth from fiscal consolidation while maintaining lower deficits and greater debt sustainability. There is some flexibility in how fast the fiscal target can be achieved, especially now that a lot of front-loaded austerity has occurred and markets are less nervous about the sustainability of public debt. Moreover, while the eurozone periphery may need more consolidation, parts of the core – say, Germany – could pursue a temporary fiscal expansion (lower taxes and more public investment) to stimulate domestic demand and growth. And a eurozone-wide infrastructure-investment program could boost demand while reducing supply-side bottlenecks.

    The third element of Draghinomics – similar to the QQE of Abenomics – will be quantitative and credit easing in the form of purchases of public bonds and measures to boost private-sector credit growth. Credit easing will start soon with targeted long-term refinancing operations (which provide subsidized liquidity to eurozone banks in exchange for faster growth in lending to the private sector). When regulatory constraints are overcome, the ECB will also begin purchasing private assets (essentially securitized bundles of banks’ new loans).

    Now Draghi has signaled that, with the eurozone one or two shocks away from deflation, the inflation outlook may soon justify quantitative easing (QE) like that conducted by the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of England: outright large-scale purchases of eurozone members’ sovereign bonds. Indeed, it is likely that QE will begin by early 2015.

    Quantitative and credit easing could affect the outlook for eurozone inflation and growth through several transmission channels. Shorter- and longer-term bond yields in core and periphery countries – and spreads in the periphery – may decline further, lowering the cost of capital for the public and private sectors. The value of the euro may fall, boosting competitiveness and net exports. Eurozone stock markets could rise, leading to positive wealth effects. Indeed, as the likelihood of QE has increased over this year, asset prices have already moved upward, as predicted.

    These changes in asset prices – together with measures that increase private-sector credit growth – can boost aggregate demand and increase inflation expectations. One should also not discount the effect on “animal spirits” – consumer, business, and investor confidence – that a credible commitment by the ECB to deal with slow growth and low inflation may trigger.

    Some more hawkish ECB officials worry that QE will lead to moral hazard by weakening governments’ commitment to austerity and structural reforms. But in a situation of near-deflation and near-recession, the ECB should do whatever is necessary, regardless of these risks.

    Moreover, QE may actually reduce moral hazard. If QE and looser short-term fiscal policies boost demand, growth, and employment, governments may be more likely to implement politically painful structural reforms and long-term fiscal consolidation. Indeed, the social and political backlash against austerity and reform is stronger when there is no income or job growth.

    Draghi correctly points out that QE would be ineffective unless governments implement faster supply side structural reforms and the right balance of short-term fiscal flexibility and medium-term austerity. In Japan, though QQE and short-term fiscal stimulus boosted growth and inflation in the short run, slow progress on the third arrow of structural reforms, along with the effects of the current fiscal consolidation, are now taking a toll on growth.

    As in Japan, all three arrows of Draghinomics must be launched to ensure that the eurozone gradually returns to competitiveness, growth, job creation, and medium-term debt sustainability in the private and public sectors. By the end of this year, it is to be hoped, the ECB will start to do its part by implementing quantitative and credit easing.

    See the original article >>

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