Tuesday, December 3, 2013

U.S. Dollar Crisis is the Next Black Swan, Gold Bottom

By: Toby_Connor

Analysts everywhere appear to be wondering what could possibly be the catalyst to turn the gold market around. I maintain it's the same catalyst that drove the gold bull market from 2001 to 2011. Out of control currency debasement.

Does anyone seriously think that we can print trillions of dollars out of thin air for five years and not eventually have something bad happen? The next the black swan is already staring us in the face. It's going to be a collapse in the purchasing power of the US dollar.

Since the beginning of the year the dollar has been showing signs of extreme stress as it began to oscillate violently back and forth in what is known as a megaphone topping pattern. When this pattern breaks to the downside it is going to initiate the beginning stages of what will likely be a fairly severe currency crisis by next fall.

In this environment I think it's going to be impossible for the manipulation in the gold market to continue. As a matter of fact I got a signal last Tuesday that indicates to me that the forces trying to manipulate gold down to $1000 have probably thrown in the towel and given up, realizing that an impending dollar crisis is about to begin.

On a cyclical analysis basis, the intermediate cycle is now running out of time for a move all the way back to the $1000 level. As you can see in the chart below the average duration for an intermediate degree cycle is between 20-25 weeks. Currently gold is on the 23rd week of this cycle.

On a smaller time frame you can see the current intermediate cycle already has four daily cycles nested within it. I don't believe there is time for a fifth daily cycle, and a fifth daily cycle would be required if gold were going to make it all the way down to $1000.

On top of that the current daily cycle is now stretched to 34 days which is already longer than 90% of historical cycles. What this means is that gold is very late in its daily cycle and a bottom is due at any time. The logical trigger would be on the employment report Friday, although I think the market will be expecting that so we may get a bottom earlier in the week.

Last week's sentiment polls are also suggesting that bearish sentiment has reached levels where the market is at risk of running out of sellers. I expect when the current weekly sentiment poll comes out later this evening we will see sentiment in both gold and silver at levels comparable to the June bottom.

Source: sentimentrader.com

To top it all off I'm starting to hear some of the usual clichés that always appear at major turning points.

"The charts are pointing down"

Folks, at bottoms the charts will always say the market is going lower. And at tops the charts will always say the market is going higher.

Then there are the numerous calls for completely unrealistic targets. I'm now starting to hear $700 price targets for gold.

I believe we are within days of a final bottom in this intermediate cycle. I think an initial 10-20% position can be taken anytime this week. Then once we get confirmation of an intermediate bottom one can start adding to that position.

I'll say it again, if one can pick, or even get close to, buying at a bear market bottom the initial move out of those bottoms are where the biggest gains in this business are made. The first two months out of the 2008 bear market bottom miners rallied 100%. I don't think it's unreasonable to expect something similar this time as this bear market has been every bit as severe as the one in 2008.

And one final confirmation before I forget. Oil appears to have put in a final intermediate bottom. Look for oil to lead the commodity complex out of this bottom.

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The Evolution of the Holiday Effect in VIX Futures

by Bill Luby

[The following originally appeared in the November 2012 edition of Expiring Monthly: The Option Traders Journal. I thought the contents might be timely in light of the upcoming holiday season.]

With fewer trading days and a historical record that favors an uptick in stocks and a downtick in volatility, the end of the year never fails to present an intriguing set of trading opportunities.

One phenomenon related to the above is something I have labeled the “holiday effect,” which is the tendency of the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) December futures to trade at a discount to the midpoint of the VIX November and January futures.

This article provides some historical analysis of the holiday effect and analyzes how the holiday effect has been manifest and evolved over the course of the past few years.

Background and Context on the Holiday Effect on the VIX Index

Part of the explanation for the holiday effect is embedded in the historical record. For instance, in eight of the last twenty years, the VIX index has made its annual low during the month of December. In fact, the VIX has demonstrated a marked tendency to decline steadily for the first 17 trading days of the month, as shown below in Figure 1, which uses normalized VIX December data to compare all VIX values for each trading day dating back to 1990. Not surprisingly, those 17 trading days neatly coincide with the typical number of December trading days in advance of the Christmas holiday.

{Figure 1: The Composite December VIX Index, 1990-2011 (source: CBOE Futures Exchange, VIX and More)}

Readers should also note that, on average, the steepest decline in the VIX usually occurs from the middle of the month right up to the Christmas holiday.

The December VIX Futures Angle

Most VIX traders are aware of the tendency of implied volatility in general and the VIX in particular to decline in December. As a result, since the launch of VIX futures in 2004, there has usually been a noticeable dip in the VIX futures term structure curve for the month of December. Figure 2 below is a snapshot of the VIX futures curve from September 12, 2012. Here I have added a dotted black line to show what a linear interpolation of the December VIX futures would look like, with the green line showing the 0.50 point differential between the actual December VIX futures settlement value of 20.40 on that date and the 20.90 interpolated value, which is derived from the November and January VIX futures contracts. (Apart from the distortions present in the December VIX futures, a linear interpolation utilizing the first and third month VIX futures normally provides an excellent estimate of the value of the second month VIX futures.)

{Figure 2: VIX Futures Curve from September 12, 2012 Showing Holiday Effect (source: CBOE Futures Exchange, VIX and More)}

Looking at the full record of historical data, the mean holiday effect for all days in which the November, December and January futures traded is 1.87%, which means that the December VIX futures have been, on average, 1.87% lower than the value predicted by a linear interpolation of the November and January VIX futures. Further analysis reveals that on 91% of all trading days, the December VIX futures are lower than their November-January interpolated value. The holiday effect, therefore, is persistent and substantial.

The History of the Holiday Effect in the December VIX Futures

Determining whether the holiday effect is statistically significant is a more daunting task, as there are only six holiday seasons from which one can derive meaningful VIX futures data. Figure 3 shows the monthly average VIX December futures (solid blue line) as well as the midpoint of the November and the January VIX futures (dotted red line) for each month since the VIX futures consecutive contracts were launched in October 2006. Here the green bars represent the magnitude of the holiday effect expressed in percentage terms, with the sign inverted (i.e., a +2% holiday effect means that the VIX December futures would be 2% below the interpolated value derived from November and January futures.)

{Figure 3: VIX December Futures Holiday Effect, 2006-2012 (source: CBOE Futures Exchange, VIX and More)}

Conclusions

With limited data from which to draw conclusions, it is tempting to eyeball the data and look for emerging patterns which may repeat in the future. Clearly one pattern is that an elevated or rising VIX appears to coincide with a larger magnitude holiday effect, whereas a depressed or falling VIX is consistent with a smaller holiday effect. The data is much less compelling when one tries to determine whether the time remaining until the holiday season has an influence on the magnitude of the holiday effect. While one might expect the holiday effect to become magnified later in the season, the evidence to support this hypothesis is scant at this stage.

To sum up, investors have readily accepted that a lower VIX is warranted for December and the downward blip in December for the VIX futures term structure reflects this thinking. As far as whether this seasonal anomaly is tradable, there is still a limited amount of data – not to mention some highly unusual volatility years – from which to develop and back test a robust VIX futures strategy designed to capture the holiday effect.

In terms of trading the holiday effect for the remainder of the year, the coming holiday season is also complicated by matters such as the fiscal cliff deadline and various euro zone milestones that are set for early 2013. In fact, there may not be a reasonable equivalent since the Y2K fears in late 1999 that turned out to be a volatility non-event when the calendar flipped to 2000.

While the opportunities to capitalize on the 2012 holiday effect may be difficult to pinpoint and fleeting, all investors should be attuned to seasonal volatility cycles as 2013 unfolds and volatility expectations ebb and flow with the news cycle as well as the calendar.

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Is the Fed Increasingly Monetizing U.S.Government Debt?

By: Axel_Merk

Fed Chair Bernanke vehemently denies Fed “monetizes the debt,” but our research shows the Fed may be increasingly doing so. We explain why and what the implications may be for the dollar, gold and currencies.

What is debt monetization? A central bank is said to monetize a government’s debt if it helps to finance its deficit. The buying of Treasuries by the Federal Reserve is a clear indication that the Fed is doing just that, except that Bernanke argues the motivation behind Treasury purchases is to help the economy, not the government.

To what extent does the Fed monetize the debt? The above chart shows that since the onset of the fall of 2008, the Fed has purchased enough Treasuries and Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), together, “quantitative easing” or (QE) to finance a substantial part of the government deficit. Indeed, by deciding not to “taper” off its purchases, the Fed is engaging in sufficient QE to purchase all debt issued and then some.

Shouldn’t one exclude MBS purchases in analyzing debt monetization? Buying MBS may provide the appearance that the Fed is not monetizing the debt when in fact it is. Don’t take our word for it, but the market’s: in a recent presentation to the CFA society in Melbourne, Merk Senior Economic Adviser and former St. Louis Fed President Bill Poole points out that the spread between 30-year fixed-rate mortgages and 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds have been virtually unchanged as a result of MBS purchases; from 1976 to 2006 the average spread was 1.74%. From May 2011 to April 2012 it averaged 1.76%. As such, the direct impact of QE on spreads has been extremely limited. If it sounds surprising, consider that investors have an array of choices that are highly similar: aside from currency risk, how different are German Treasuries versus U.S. Treasuries? Highly rated U.S. corporate issues versus U.S. Treasuries? They all have distinct risk profiles, but there’s a good reason why absent of issuer-specific news, these securities tend to trade in tandem. As such, the Fed is really just sipping with a straw from the ocean: setting rates may be more a result of communication (the “credibility of the Fed”) rather than the actual purchases.

If rates are set by words rather than action, doesn’t that prove the point the Fed is not monetizing the debt? We agree that talk is cheap. But talk doesn’t always move the market; as confidence in the Fed’s ability to control rates erodes, policy becomes ever more expensive: cutting rates, emergency rate cuts, Treasury purchases, Operation Twist, and moving to an explicit employment target are all escalations of a policy to “convince” the market to keep rates low. And along the way, the Fed has to spend more money. Ask the Fed, and they’ll tell you their operations are profitable. Clearly, as the Fed creates money out of thin air to buy income-generating fixed income securities, the more the Fed “prints”, the more profitable it is. Except that there’s no free lunch and pigs still can’t fly. By all means, no central bank in their right mind would start out with a policy to monetize debt. But as the chart above shows, the Fed now spends over 150% of government deficit to hold rates down, suggesting that its firing power is eroding. If and when we come to the stage that the Fed were to explicitly monetize the debt, it may need to buy a high multiple of what it currently does and might still fail to keep rates low. It’s a confidence game.

What happened when the Fed decided not to “taper” its bond purchase program? As the chart above shows, something went wrong, very wrong. As tax revenue has picked up throughout the year, government deficits have come down. As such, reducing QE would have been warranted. By choosing not to “taper,” one can argue that QE has actually increased, as the Fed is buying above and beyond newly issued debt. Note the Fed will push back yet again, arguing it cannot buy debt directly from the government only in the secondary market. But that may well be semantics. As a large bond manager has pointed out: in the absence of QE, we might have to sell debt to one another, rather than to the Fed.

Where’s debt monetization heading? The way we see the dynamics playing out, this confidence game will go on for some time, yet we may increasingly be seeing cracks. Lower government deficits may be a short-term phenomenon as over the long-term the cost of entitlements and interest payments may rise substantially, highlighting that deficits may not be sustainable. In 10 years from now, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the U.S. government may be paying $600 billion more a year in interest expense alone; indeed, if the average cost of borrowing went back up to the average cost of borrowing since the 1970s, the government may need to pay $1 trillion more per year in interest expense alone. To us, this suggests the biggest threat we are facing may be economic growth. That’s because the bond market has been most sensitive to good economic data; yet, should the bond market sell off (increasing the cost of borrowing), the cost of financing U.S. government deficits may escalate. We already have a Fed that has indicated interest rates will stay low for an extended period. In some ways, the Fed has all but guaranteed that it will be slow in raising rates. We interpret that as the Fed being slow to rising inflationary pressures that are likely to increase should the economy ever pick up again.

This is all too abstract – how will this play out? If you think this is abstract, think Japan. Let the Japanese be successful with their policies, let them achieve sustained economic growth. What do you think will happen to Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs)? JGBs might plunge, making it difficult, if not impossible, to finance Japan’s massive government debt burden. Few observers doubt that the Bank of Japan (BoJ) may step in to help finance government deficits. That’s debt monetization. We think the valve for Japan will be the yen that won’t survive this. When we discuss this with investors, most agree that this is a real risk for Japan. But don’t kid yourself: even if we may be able to kick the can down the road for longer in the U.S., we think it may be hazardous to one’s wealth to ignore the risks posed to the dollar due to a toxic mix of monetary and fiscal policy.

How do I prepare as an investor? The way we look at the world is in terms of scenarios: if a scenario is sufficiently likely, we think investors should take it into account in their portfolio allocation; professional investors may even have it as their fiduciary duty. To us, the short answer is that there is no such thing anymore as a risk free investment and investors may want to take a diversified approach to something as mundane as cash. Investors may want to consider throwing out the risk free component in their asset allocation. That’s because the purchasing power of the U.S. dollar may be at risk.

Is gold the answer? Gold has performed rather poorly this year and is increasingly being written off. Yet, those writing off gold should think twice about where they see the economy and the Fed heading. If one believes we will return to a “normal” environment and we’ll live happily ever after, maybe those gold naysayers have a point. But keep in mind that incoming Fed Chair Janet Yellen stated during her confirmation hearings that we shall return to a normal Fed policy once the economy is back to normal. To us, that’s an oxymoron: we cannot return to a normal economy when the Fed prevents risk being priced by market forces. To us, gold is more than “insurance” to adverse scenarios as some say, as we find it difficult to see how we’ll be facing positive real interest rates for an extended period over the coming decade.

Is a basket of currencies the answer? The Chinese government diversifies its reserves to a basket of currencies, clearly adding currency risk to their portfolio. Conversely, U.S. investors may want to consider diversifying to a basket of currencies if they believe we ultimately have the better “printing press” than the rest of the world?

But isn’t it more complex than that? In some ways, yes. Governments won’t give up without a fight. We believe policy makers want to do the right thing, except that the road to hell might be paved with good intentions. Just consider if Japan truly has a problem: Japan is no Cyprus, meaning that shockwaves of a Japanese government in turmoil might be felt around the world. Aside from cash not being “safe,” political stability may also continue to erode throughout the world, as citizens worldwide dissatisfied that their wages don’t keep up with an increasing cost of living elect ever more populist politicians. The only good news we can see is that our policy makers may be predictable and an investment strategy based on staying a step ahead of policy makers might be worth considering. Think currency wars, and think diversifying on a more pro-active basis. We are not suggesting investors become day traders, but we think the currency markets may be well suited to take positions on how one believes these dynamics may play out.

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Stock Market Sell Signals Abound

By: Anthony_Cherniawski

The NYSE Hi-Lo index went negative this morning and exceeded its two prior lows. This confirms the sell signal in SPX.

The VIX also confirmed its buy signal and inversely, confirmed the SPX sell signal as well. We may see an extended, super-sized minute Wave [iii] that could push it to its Cycle Top at 18.11 and send it on its way back to its inverted Head & Shoulders neckline at 24.00. The small Head & Shoulders pattern that was triggered yesterday (not shown) has a minimum target of 15.89.

SPX is back-testing its Broadening Wedge trendline. We could see further a bounce back to the Head & Shoulders neckline at 1802.76 before resuming its decline. That may be an indication of a more complex and possibly stronger decline.

1802.00 would be an excellent area to max out on the short side.

More to come later.

Regards,

Tony

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Bernanke/Yellen To Drive Stocks 30% Higher

by Lance Roberts

That's right, despite all of the recent "bubble talk," it is entirely possible that stocks could rise 30% higher from here.  However, it is not because valuations are cheap because as I discussed in my recent analysis of Q3 earnings stocks are trading near 19x trailing earnings.

"Understanding this it is easy to understand the flaw in using "forward" estimates as a valuation tool.  The use of forward, operating estimates, is only beneficial to Wall Street analysts who need to create a "valuation" story when none really exists.  Overly optimistic assumptions about the future spurs faulty analysis in the present as sliding earnings leads to sharp valuation increases. The chart below shows the progression of forward P/E estimates since the beginning of 2012.  Currently, with the S&P 500 valued at 18.89x reported earnings, it is hard to justify that the market is undervalued."

The primary reason that stocks are likely to climb 30% higher from current levels, over the next 24-months, is because that is what happens during the "mania" phase of a bull market cycle.  This is something that Richard Russell recently defined as:

"The third or speculative phase of a bull market is characterized by a wild and wooly and ever-increasing entrance by the retail public. This phase is characterized by hot tips, hype and pure greed."

As I stated previously it is probably too early to say that we are deep within "bubble" territory because simply too many people are talking about.  It is reminiscent of Alan Greenspan in 1996 uttering the words "irrational exuberance."  The fear of irrational exuberance was eventually quelled by a belief that "this time was indeed different" due to the "new era" of technology.  Ever higher levels of valuations were justified through "forward earnings expectations" and modified "valuation analysis" that, as always throughout history, ultimately failed to materialize.

Currently, individual investors are once again piling into equities under the belief, once again, that this time is different.  In 1999, it was the "tech boom,"  followed in 2007 by the "real estate/credit boom."  Today, it is the inherent belief that the "Fed's accommodative policy"  trumps all other issues.   "Don't Fight The Fed" has become the retail investor's call to arms as shown by the chart of money flows into retail equity mutual funds by ICI.  (Note:  Only the first two weeks of November are included which are already as great as the full month of October)

ICI-NetEquity-Inflows-112113

The support provided by the Federal Reserve has given investors a false sense of complacency regarding the risks of chasing yield in the financial markets.  However, that has always been the hallmark of the late stages of bull market cycles.

"The Beatings Will Continue Until Morale Improves"

Ben Bernanke has been very clear in his communications that the Federal Reserve will continue with its "ultra-accommodative monetary policies" until there are significant signs of improvement in the economic data.  One of his key phrases has been:

“When, ultimately, asset purchases do slow, it will likely be because the economy has progressed sufficiently for the Committee to rely more heavily on its rate policies,”

The term "ultimately" is the key phrase in this regard as it implies that there current stance could remain in place for quite some time to come.  This is especially the case when you consider that the Fed's biggest fear is actually getting worse; deflation.

"The [inflation] index is clearly warning of rising deflationary pressures in the economy, which has recently been seen in many of the manufacturing reports that have shown downward pricing pressures both on prices paid and received, there is no 'exit' currently for the Federal Reserve to reduce its monetary supports.  The real concern is that with the index at just 5.11%, which is well below the long term average of 11.62%, that the economy is far to weak to handle much of an exogenous shock.

The risk, as discussed recently with relation to Japan, is that the Fed is now caught within a 'liquidity trap.'  The Fed cannot effectively withdraw from monetary interventions and raise interest rates to more productive levels without pushing the economy back into a recession. The overriding deflationary drag on the economy is forcing the Federal Reserve to remain ultra-accommodative to support the current level of economic activity. What is interesting is that mainstream economists and analysts keep predicting stronger levels of economic growth while all economic indications are indicating just the opposite.

Despite the Fed's recent communications that they are planning to "taper" the current monetary program by the end of this year - the index is suggesting that their interventions, in one form or another, are unlikely to end anytime soon as the threat of 'deflation' remains the Fed's primary concern."

High-Inflation-Index-112013

Of course, it is not just Bernanke that maintains this stance but also his replacement Janet Yellen who has already indicated that she very much supports, and will maintain, Bernanke's current monetary policy regime.  As I stated recently in "Yellen Promises More," the lack of "economic success" will likely mean that the Fed remains engaged in its ongoing QE programs for much longer than currently expected.  The real surprise in 2014 could very well be an increase in size and scope of the current quantitative easing programs if interest rates remain elevated, deflationary pressures continue to increase and economic growth stalls. The injection of more liquidity could very well drive asset prices to the irrational extremes of a true market bubble.  However, if that occurs, the majority of market analysts and economists will not be talking about a "bubble" in asset prices but why "this time is truly different."

Jeremy Grantham of GMO, via ZeroHedge, more eloquently discussed this idea:

"My personal guess is that the U.S. market, especially the non-blue chips, will work its way higher, perhaps by 20% to 30% in the next year or, more likely, two years, with the rest of the world including emerging market equities covering even more ground in at least a partial catch-up. And then we will have the third in the series of serious market busts since 1999 and presumably Greenspan, Bernanke, Yellen, et al. will rest happy, for surely they must expect something like this outcome given their experience. And we the people, of course, will get what we deserve. We acclaimed the original perpetrator of this ill-fated plan – Greenspan – to be the great Maestro, in a general orgy of boot licking. His faithful acolyte, Bernanke, was reappointed by a democratic president and generally lauded for doing (I admit) a perfectly serviceable job of rallying the troops in a crash that absolutely would not have occurred without the dangerous experiments in deregulation and no regulation (of the subprime instruments, for example) of his and his predecessor’s policy. At this rate, one day we will praise Yellen (or a similar successor) for helping out adequately in the wreckage of the next utterly unnecessary financial and asset class failure. Deregulation was eventually a disappointment even to Greenspan, shocked at the bad behavior of financial leaders who, incomprehensibly to him, were not even attempting to maximize long-term risk-adjusted profits. Indeed, instead of the 'price discovery' so central to modern economic theory we had 'greed discovery.'"

The following chart, which I have used many times in the past, supports this idea of a continued liquidity driven market melt-up.  It is simply an extrapolation of the correlation between the S&P 500 index and the Federal Reserve's balance sheet.

Fed-Balance-Sheet-VS-SP500-112013

At the current rate of balance sheet expansion, and assuming that correlations remain, the markets could well rise to 2329 by the end of 2015.  This would also mean the Fed's balance sheet would have also expanded beyond $6 Trillion.  This would likely imply that the Fed would own more than 50% of the treasury market.

The problem with this analysis is that it assumes that everything else remains status quo.  The reality is that some exogenous shock will come along that causes a more severe reversion in the markets as current extensions become more extreme.   As Grantham noted:

"What can go wrong for the market? There is a slow and for me rather sinister slowing down of economic growth, most obviously in Europe but also globally, that could at worst overwhelm even the Fed. The general lack of fiscal stimulus globally and the almost precipitous decline in the U.S. Federal deficit in particular do not help."

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Engulfing bearish patterns in Europe…Will it spill over to the States?

by Chris Kimble

CLICK ON CHART TO ENLARGE

The above 3-pack looks at long-term patterns in France, London and Germany. Each chart reflects attempted breakouts is at hand, for these major markets.

The gray boxes take a very short-term snap shot of each market at the resistance and the red oval highlights "engulfing bearish patterns" in these key markets.

What goes up in a down market?  Correlation!!!

The Power of the Pattern reflected that the majority of the key worlds index were all "attempting breakouts at the same time!" (see post here)

If the worlds markets don't succeed breaking out at the same time, could the majority of the turn weak at the same time since correlation is so high?  Stay tuned...

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