Wednesday, February 9, 2011

Commodities to Beat Emerging Market Stocks in 2011, SocGen Says

By Chanyaporn Chanjaroen

(Bloomberg) -- Commodities will beat stocks in China, Brazil and other emerging economies this year as inflationary pressure curbs equity gains, said Societe Generale.

Growth of raw-material consumption in emerging economies led by China will be sustained even as prices advance, said commodity analyst Jeremy Friesen, who was a strategist at Morgan Stanley in New York before joining the Paris-based bank. The Shanghai Composite Index, which tracks the bigger of China’s stock exchanges, dropped 14 percent last year as the Dow Jones- UBS Commodity Total Return index climbed 17 percent.

“Prices of commodities will have to go up to rationalize the investments to produce commodities as well as consumption,” Friesen said yesterday in a phone interview from Hong Kong. “Corporates are going to have to deal with how to be profitable and yet still facing higher costs.”

Investors have pulled money from funds tracking developing- nation stocks because of concern about stock valuations and inflationary pressure, EPFR Global said last week. Outflows totaled $7 billion from all emerging-market equity funds during the week ended Feb. 2, the most in three years, it said. Energy and commodity-related funds attracted more investment, it said.
China’s consumer prices advanced 3.3 percent last year, breaching a government target of 3 percent. The January rate may have quickened to 5.4 percent, according to the median estimate of 10 economists surveyed by Bloomberg News, from 4.6 percent in December. Inflation in Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s biggest economy, was 7.02 percent last month, a 21-month high, the Central Bureau of Statistics said.

Copper, Cotton

Copper climbed to a record $10,160 a metric ton yesterday, boosted by expanding manufacturing activity in China and the U.S., the top consumers. Cotton advanced to an all-time high of $1.8122 per pound last week and palladium, used in autocatalysts, increased to the highest level since 2001.

The advance in commodity prices will be sustained “if policy makers continue to be leaning onto the stimulant side, which I believe they will continue to be,” Friesen said, referring to low interest rates and measures to boost growth.

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Are commodity prices set to rise further on increasing global demand?

by Chris Shaw

For Goldman Sachs, aluminium is the least preferred of the base metals on a 12-month view. But even allowing for this, the broker suggests there are some emerging signs the longer-term outlook for the metal is beginning to improve.

Global aluminium consumption was better than Goldman Sachs had forecast in 2010, which has positive implications for the demand side of its model in coming years. Some producer constraint is needed, but the broker is now forecasting market deficits from 2013 onwards.

Also supportive is China's growing focus on energy efficiency, which could mean domestic aluminium production in that country lags the expected increase in demand. Goldman Sachs is forecasting Chinese demand growth of 8.2% through 2015, a figure it suggests may prove conservative.

The release of substantial inventories may hold back the rate of price appreciation in Goldman Sachs's view, so for that reason the broker suggests it remains too early for all but long-term investors to look for direct exposure to aluminium.

Goldman Sachs is forecasting average annual aluminium prices of US103c per pound this year, US106c per pound in 2012 and US110c per pound in 2013.

Over in copper, Credit Suisse suggests for prices to commence a further leg up LME stocks need to fall. A key indicator behind this dynamic, according to the broker, is the SHFE-LME spread. The current Shanghai discount relative to LME prices suggests China is not experiencing the copper squeeze that many have expected.

One explanation is China is currently de-stocking, but Credit Suisse argues current price activity could also be explained by an acceleration in substitution for the metal. Either way, the broker's view is China is unlikely to be able to support exports for long, so there should be an acceleration of the tightening of the Shanghai market in coming weeks and months.

To reflect this the broker has revised up its estimates, Credit Suisse now forecasting average annual copper prices of US$4.70 per pound this year, US$4.50 per pound in 2012 and US$3.80 per pound in 2013. This compares to previous forecasts of US$3.95 per pound this year and US$3.90 per pound in 2012.

Citi has updated on the bulk commodities sector, noting the recent floods in Queensland are likely to keep Australian coal exports constrained for several months given waterlogged mines, low inventories and some damage to infrastructure.

On Citi's best case estimates the coking coal market will see a shortfall of 18 million tonnes, something that has already pushed prices higher given gains of nearly 50% to US$324 per tonne since the flooding began around the start of the year.

Given monsoon season is still some way from being over and with inventories at critical lows, Citi's view is coal prices have yet to peak.

In steel, industry consultant MEPS is forecasting global crude stainless steel output for 2010 will have hit an all-time high of 30.45 million tonnes. If the group's forecast is correct this would be 7.4% above the previous record recorded in 2006 and 24% above 2009 levels.

The record is unlikely to last long, as MEPS is forecasting total output of more than 31 million tonnes in 2011. Most regions will contribute to this, with Japanese production likely to be up 27% from 2009 levels, while Chinese production is forecast to have more than doubled since 2006.

EU activity also picked up in the final quarter of 2010, while MEPS notes US production has also risen strongly from 2009 levels.

In steel generally, MEPS expects total global output for 2010 of just over 1.4 billion tonnes, an increase of 16% or 190 million tonnes from 2009's output. Accounting for about 50% of the increase will be stronger production in China, the US and Japan, while German and South Korean output has also improved.

MEPS sees the economic outlook for 2011 as cautiously optimistic, with certain sections of Western economies performing well but construction markets still experiencing depressed activity levels. This will keep a lid on steel output in the coming years, with MEPS forecasting total global steel production in 2011 of 1,485 million tonnes.

Base Metals turn hot commodities in China

by Commodity Online

China has turned out to be the global nerve centre for base metals. Surging demand from China for base metals like copper, zinc, lead and aluminium is helping the commodities output to grow at unprecedented levels.

According to Barclays Capital, in 2010 while the base metals output from China soared at record levels, the growth phase for these commodities is going up in 2011.

“For many of the metals, the strength in domestic raw material production resulted in a reduction in the proportion of imports used in refined metal production,” Barclays said in a recent research note.

“How sustainable this trend proves to be will be a key factor behind relative price performance.” In the case of copper, Barclays says it looks for slower but still strong growth in domestic output, although not enough to dent the need for imports.

For tin, it may be difficult to replicate last year’s supply growth since much was due to improved efficiency at existing mines and recovery of tailings.

For lead and zinc, an increase in 2010 output was due to small mines running at full speed, but current mines are facing a declining ore-reserve base, so strong growth will depend on factors such as investment in large mines.

Barclays said: “Overall, the impact on prices and market balances of slower Chinese base-metals production growth will depend on how this is counterbalanced with slower demand growth, with lead and zinc the metals where this will be a key swing factor for 2011.”

The bank further said that Chinese demand for base metals will grow in 2011, assuming there is not an “over-tightening” of monetary conditions.

The People’s Bank of China has said that it will raise interest rates for the third time since mid-October, with the one-year yuan lending rate moving to 6.06% from 5.81%.

“China raised rates from 2004 to early 2008 without interrupting the upward trend in prices. In our view provided there isn’t an over-tightening, then Chinese base metals demand will still be on track for another year of strong, albeit slower, growth,” Barclays said.

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How High (or Low) Could the Stock Market Go?

By CHARLES HUGH SMITH
 
The U.S. stock market has been on a tear since September, gaining more than 20% in a mere five months. For perspective, annual equity returns average about 5% over the long run.

That means the market has logged four years of average gains in only five months. And it raises the question: What's next for the U.S. markets, not just next month, but in the next year or two?

The bullish case is well established: The economic recovery is solidly advancing, corporate profits are still rising, inflation is low and some evidence shows companies are starting to hire again.

Let's look at a 10-year chart to identify the bullish targets for the Dow: 13,000 and then 14,000.


Chartists have long noted that long-term tops often form what is called a "head and shoulders" pattern in which lower "shoulders" precede and follow the peak or "head." This pattern is clearly visible in the Dow's 2007-2008 top and decline.

The sharp 84% rise from the March 2009 low has brought the Dow back above the 12,000 level and into a band of resistance and potential support around 11,900 to 12,200. The next stop for the bulls is 13,000, the left shoulder on the chart above, last touched in 2008. Beyond that, the next goal is the 14,000 level that marked the 2007 top.

From the view of a 10-year chart, we can see that this advance from 6,500 to 12,170 has been meteoric compared to the more leisurely recovery from 2003-2006, when it took about four years for the market to advance from 7,600 to over 12,000. This suggests that the past two years have been extraordinary rather than typical, and so we might expect more typical returns in the years ahead.

What's Typical?
You'd think figuring out what "typical returns" are would be a relatively straightforward calculation, but -- as with many things financial -- it turns out to be complicated. Some calculate long-term annual returns of around 7% , and others estimate 6.5% as a reasonable expectation for total returns, or dividends plus appreciation/growth. Yet other careful analyses reckon that a return of roughly 4.1% is more realistic.
Why is it so difficult to assess mean returns over the long term? Economists Eugene Fama and Kenneth French have shown that the uncertainties of expected returns don't diminish over long time frames, so the uncertainties of 30-year and 50-year returns are higher than shorter-term yields. In effect, the uncertainty over two years is four times the uncertainty over one year.

Calculating long-term returns and mean returns turns out to be an inherently iffy proposition. "In particular, we don't know the true expected returns on portfolios," Fama wrote in an investment forum in 2009. "We typically use historical average returns to estimate expected returns, but the estimates are quite noisy, and they leave lots of uncertainty about true expected returns."

In other words, projections using average annual returns are guesstimates because historical returns aren't reliable guides.

To put this truism into perspective, let's turn to some longer-term charts showing the Dow, from 1977 to the present, and the broad-based S&P 500 index , from 1965 to the present.




We can see that stocks really took off in 1995, and made an unprecedented ascent in five short years to the dot-com top in 2000. In the Dow, this top marks what could be a left shoulder in a multiyear topping pattern, with the peak reached about seven years later in 2007 tracing out the head. If this pattern holds, then the current rally may be the right shoulder.

Alternatively, the Dow might reach for the 14,000 level, and either form a double top there or move on to new heights.

The S&P 500 has already traced out a multiyear double top, with the first peak in 2000 and the second in 2007.

A Return to the Long-Term Average

One tool statisticians use is the " regression (or reversion) to the mean ," which refers to the probability that extremes of activity or response tend to revert to the long-term average.

This suggests that any period of extreme outperformance, such as the past 22 months, will be followed by lower and more average returns.

We can estimate the mean return in several ways. On the charts, I took 2% above inflation as a baseline return. At this rate, $1 invested in 1989, six years into the great 1982-2000 Bull Market, would have grown to $1.52 in 2010. A dollar in 1989 now equals $1.76 in 2010 dollars , so I've multiplied our return by 1.76 to adjust for inflation.

By these calculations, the Dow should be around 5,300 and the S&P 500 should be about 800.

If we forget inflation and just plug in an annual mean return of 6.5%, then the S&P 500 should be about 1,125. If we go with a 5% mean return, then the S&P 500 should be around 835.

A Safe Bet, If. . .

Author and analyst Jeremy Siegel found that since the early 1800s, equities had never offered a negative return , after inflation, if held for 17 years or more. That suggests stocks are a safe bet for long-term investors, if they can handle short-term volatility.

Technically speaking, these long-term charts suggest that stocks entered an unusual period of outperformance in 1995 that will eventually end as returns revert to longer-term averages. Nobody knows what those averages will be, but we can look to history from some guidance, and to charts for possible future outcomes.

 
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THE FED IS NOT MONETIZING THE DEBT

by Cullen Roche

The Fed’s purchases of treasuries continue to attract a huge amount of attention.  Despite solid evidence that the program is failing to have any real fundamental economic impact there are other worries about the program.  None has been more apparent in recent weeks than the Fed’s supposed monetization of the US government’s debt.  These fears of monetization are unfounded due to the various myths that are perpetually touted by the mainstream media, supposed experts on the US monetary system and even Fed officials.

In an article Monday, Bloomberg reported that the Fed has been buying an exorbitant proportion of the recently issued treasury debt:
“More than 40 percent of the government bonds the Fed bought in January for its so-called quantitative easing were auctioned in the previous 90 days, up from 20 percent in December and 15 percent in November, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch. The central bank is concentrating on newer securities as its $600 billion program depletes primary dealers’ holdings of Treasuries to the lowest since November 2009.”
Why does this matter?  Because it gives the appearance that the US government is directly funding itself via the Fed’s purchases.  This would be nefarious if it were true and would give credence to the endless complaints about the high rate of inflation in the USA (which is currently running at a staggering 1.5%-2.25% depending on the source).  Fortunately, the concerns are unfounded.

When the US government was working under the gold standard the US Treasury would literally print up certificates to purchase gold from the gold mines.  These gold bars would be delivered to the government and the Treasury would issue a check to the miner.  This new money would end up at the Federal Reserve Bank in the form of deposits.  This would naturally increase the money supply.   An increase in the money supply is scary for obvious reasons.   So, the term debt monetization has its origins in the days of the gold standard, but persists to this day despite the fact that we are no longer on a gold standard.  Not surprisingly, the term is still used today despite the fact that the US government can’t monetize its debt via Fed purchases (I elaborate below).

This issue was magnified yesterday when Richard Fisher of the Dallas Fed invoked the evil “debt monetization” term in his speech:
“the FOMC collectively decided in November to temporarily undertake a program to purchase U.S. Treasuries that, when added to previous policy initiatives, roughly means we will be purchasing the equivalent of all newly issued Treasury debt through June.  By this action, we have run the risk of being viewed as an accomplice to Congress’ fiscal nonfeasance. To avoid that perception, we must vigilantly protect the integrity of our delicate franchise. There are limits to what we can do on the monetary front to provide the bridge financing to fiscal sanity. The head of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, said it best recently while speaking in Germany: “Monetary policy responsibility cannot substitute for government irresponsibility.”
The entire FOMC knows the history and the ruinous fate that is meted out to countries whose central banks take to regularly monetizing government debt. Barring some unexpected shock to the economy or financial system, I think we are pushing the envelope with the current round of Treasury purchases. I would be very wary of expanding our balance sheet further; indeed, given current economic and financial conditions, it is hard for me to envision a scenario where I would not use my voting position this year to formally dissent should the FOMC recommend another tranche of monetary accommodation. And I expect I will be at the forefront of the effort to trim back our Treasury holdings and tighten policy at the earliest sign that inflationary pressures are moving beyond the commodity markets and into the general price stream. I am a veteran of the Carter administration and know how easily prices can spin out of control and how cruelly markets can exact their revenge. I would not want to relive that experience.”
Fisher’s implication is that the Fed is directly helping to fund the US government’s spending.  After all, if they’re buying the debt then they’re obviously funding the spending, right?  Wrong.  As regular readers know, the US government is never constrained in its ability to spend.  Our monetary system underwent a dramatic change when Richard Nixon closed the gold window. It removed any constraint on the US government’s ability to spend.  Nonetheless, the operating structure of the gold standard (issuing bonds, etc) still largely remained intact.

The issuance of bonds continues to this day due to Congressional mandate.  In reality, our bond market funds nothing and serves only as a reserve drain which helps the Fed maintain its overnight target interest rate.  It has nothing to do with funding the government.  When the US government wants to spend money they do not call China and ask for a line of credit.  They do not count tax receipts.  And they most certainly do not call the Fed to ensure that we have any money left.  No, the truth is that the USA never really has nor doesn’t have any money.  So the entire implication that the Fed is helping to fund US government expenditures is entirely inaccurate and anyone who implies as much is still working under the now defunct gold standard model and clearly doesn’t understand the workings of the modern monetary system.

For a brief instant, Mr. Fisher appears as though he is on the verge of understanding the system he now heavily influences as a new voting member of the FOMC.  Mr. Fisher says that the spending effectively comes first:
“But here is the essential fact I want to emphasize and have you think about today: The Fed could not monetize the debt if the debt were not being created by Congress in the first place….The Fed does not create government debt; Congress does.”
Lights should be going off in Mr. Fisher’s head at this point as he says this.  This is important because Mr. Fisher is essentially acknowledging that the Fed is not the entity that actually conducts helicopter drops.  Of course, spending comes before debt issuance.  It can be no other way in a monetary system such as ours.  The Fed’s role in this process is purely monetary.  It has nothing to do with the fiscal side.  The Fed does not “print money”.  Congress is the entity that prints money via deficit spending.  And they always decide how much to spend before considering any potential constraint from taxes or bond issuance.  Unlike a household or state the US government does not need money before it spends.  From a common sense perspective, you would think that this would set alarms off in most people’s heads, however, it does not.  The idea that the US government is never revenue constrained is so foreign to most people that their minds repel it.

By now you might be thinking that this is all semantics.  Who cares if the Fed isn’t helping to fund the spending?  They’re still buying the bonds and the spending is occurring regardless of the Fed’s actions.  Well, it’s important for several reasons:
1) Someone who understands the modern monetary system understands that a sovereign government with monopoly supply of currency in a floating exchange rate system has no solvency issue.  Therefore, it should not be treated as if it is a household, business or state.
2) If solvency is not a concern then clearly the concern is inflation or potential hyperinflation.  But as we’ve seen over the last few years the Fed has not succeeded at creating inflation anywhere close to the historical average and certainly not dangerously high levels of inflation.  To someone who understands how the modern monetary system functions it not surprising then, that the Fed has been unable to generate inflation during a balance sheet recession.
3) Fear mongerers want you to believe that the Fed is the evil entity that “prints money”.  The truth is that the Fed can do no such thing.  Only Congress can print money and it’s clear that their actions in recent years have failed to generate significant inflation.  This is a sign that the government’s spending has been ineffective and misguided.  Although I acknowledge that the US Congress is never constrained in its ability to spend this by no means implies that the US Congress should spend beyond its means.  To do so can possibly result in malinvestment or very high inflation.
4) The idea that the Fed is buying government debt might imply that there are is a shortage of buyers of US debt.  This is impossible as government debt issuance serves only as a reserve drain.  Auctions are designed around calculated reserves and are carefully designed so as not to fail.
5) Voting members of the FOMC do not understand the actual workings of the Federal Reserve System and the US monetary system and have played a direct role in the misguided policy response in recent years.  Of course, this is nothing new.  This problem has persisted throughout the entirety of the last 40 years and is largely to blame for the structural flaws in the US economy currently.
6) The overwhelming majority of US citizens have no idea how the US monetary system actually functions and therefore are reluctant or unable to force any sort of real change.  Those with political or monetary motivations tend to invoke fearful language that incites anger and in truth only adds to the problems in the US economy by driving the voter base to react to their emotions and not their knowledge of the system in which they reside.
7) Quantitative easing does not increase the money supply and is therefore not inflationary.  Although this operation can have significant psychological impacts (such as inducing undue speculation) QE can only work in the same manner that traditional monetary policy is implemented at the short-end of the curve.  This occurs by setting a target rate and by being a willing buyer of any size at that rate.  This is NOT how the current policy is designed.  The current structure of QE leaves interest rates entirely controlled by the marketplace and not the Fed.  Therefore, the mixed results should come as no surprise to anyone as the policy was poorly designed to begin with and is likely doing little more than contributing to excessive speculation and promoting the continued financialization of the US economy.  The Fed’s implementation of such policies (such as QE) and complete misunderstanding of such policies does nothing but help create disequilibrium in the marketplace and increase the odds of future instability.
8 ) Monetization is achieved by act of Congress via deficit spending and is independent of the Fed’s monetary policy.  Anyone who uses the term in the context of the Fed’s contribution of government spending does not understand how the modern monetary system works.  In a strict technical sense, monetization is always done by act of Congress and is voted on before funding is ever acquired for such expenditures – funding that will always be available regardless of tax receipts or bond sales….
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THE CENTRAL BANK IS CAUSING INFLATION

by Cullen Roche

For years now we’ve been hearing stories about how the US central bank was going to expand its balance sheet and reserves would fly out of banks like they were being dropped from helicopters and hyperinflation would quickly ensue.  Of course, no such thing happened, however, we did see a remarkable increase in the money supply.  No, not the US money supply, but the Chinese money supply.

Two years ago I said the Chinese were venturing into dangerous territory with a massive stimulus plan that was likely unnecessary and excessively large.  I believed it had the real potential for an inflation scare in China.  Two years later that appears to be the case.  And we need look no further than the money supply to put this into perspective.  Over the course of the last three years the Chinese M2 money supply has skyrocketed higher by over 70%:
Given the extraordinary actions of the Fed in recent years you might assume that the USA has an equally awful looking situation.  But the evidence simply doesn’t support such a conclusion.   The USA’s M2 money supply has expanded by a meager 16% over the last three years.  That’s a 5% increase per year during one of the most destructive recessions the USA has ever experienced.  Broader measures of the money supply show that the M3 supply is still contracting (see Shadow Stats or nowandfutures.com for some perspective).  This is not to say that the Fed has not encouraged imprudence, speculation and no loser capitalism, but if high inflation is their goal it’s difficult to say that they have succeeded.  After all, inflation in the USA is running at 1.5%-2.25% depending on your source.
China has vowed to combat inflation, however, there are little to no signs that they are serious about tackling the issue.   After all, they have elections coming up and a national target of 8% GDP growth that you can be certain they will maintain at any cost.  Even if it means rapidly increasing inflation and ensuing commodity price increases that only hurt the rest of the global economy.

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